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Abstract 
 
The thesis is about South Africa’s foreign relations towards Kenya. South 
Africa aims to promote democratic peace and stability in the continent. Given 
Kenya’s hegemonic position in the region, one would expect that in pursuit of 
its foreign policy in the East African region, South Africa would naturally drift 
towards Kenya as a partner. This has not been an obvious case; this study 
seeks to investigate why this is so. The thesis begins with theoretical 
conceptualisations, then a brief historical background on South Africa’s Kenya 
foreign relations. The third Chapter shall look Kenya’s political and economic 
position in the East African region. The fourth Chapter shall focus on the 
political and economic dynamics concerning South Africa- Kenyan relations. 
The thesis concludes that South Africa’s foreign policy is complex and cannot 
be understood properly by using only one traditional international relations 
school of thought. The thesis provides recommendations for the improvement 
of relations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Time frames: The thesis will focus on post apartheid South Africa’s foreign 
policy relations (i.e. from Mandela to Mbeki). 
The study is intended to pursue the following aims: 
• To investigate and explain the nature of South Africa’s foreign 
policy towards Kenya. 
• To assess the strategic relevance of Kenya to South Africa’s 
foreign policy in East Africa. 
• To contribute to an understanding of South Africa’s foreign 
relations with the East African region and the continent at 
large. 
 
It should be noted that South Africa’s relations with the continent will serve as 
a background of the thesis. It will be necessary to understand the idea of the 
African Renaissance which hypothetically drives South Africa’s foreign policy.  
It should also be noted that the thesis would not provide an analysis of 
Kenya’s foreign policy. The thesis is only interested in how South Africa’s 
relations with Kenya have evolved. 
Rationale: Why is the study important? 
This thesis is important because post apartheid South Africa has made Africa 
a priority in its foreign policy relations (le Roux, 2000). The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and then Africa are South Africa’s foreign 
policy priorities (DFA Strategic Plan, 2006). Landsberg explains that South 
Africa seeks to promote peace and stability in the continent driven by the logic 
that a stable and peaceful continent is in South Africa’s direct national 
interests (Landsberg, 2006). This prioritisation can be understood within the 
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vision of a new Africa, which is the idea of the African Renaissance (Adebajo, 
2007). 
 
Various foreign policy analysts (such as Adebajo, 2007; Barber, 2005; 
Buhlungu et al, 2007; Kabema, 2007; Landsberg, 2006; Schoeman, 2000;  
Solomon, 1997; Streamlau, 2006; van Nieukerk, 2006 and Venter, 2001) have 
described a number of South Africa’s relations with different parts of the 
continent e.g. Nigeria, DRC, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda among 
others. There is however, little material focusing on its relations with Kenya. 
Kenya is the dominant economy in the East African region and is also 
relatively stable compared to most of its neighbours1 (especially before the 
violence which erupted after December 2007) (Barkan, 2007). 
 
Given Kenya’s position in the region, one would expect that in pursuit of its 
foreign policy which emphasises the promotion of democratic peace, South 
Africa would drift towards Kenya as a partner. This has not been an obvious 
case. The study will investigate why this is so. The history of relations is that 
Kenya, compared to Tanzania for example was not very supportive of the 
South African liberation struggle (Communist Journal, 1982), (Ogweno, 1986). 
It was against this background that relations between South Africa and Kenya 
were not very warm during the early days of post apartheid. Post- 1994 
relations started on a lukewarm or even ‘tense’ atmosphere; but relations 
have gradually improved, especially since 2002. The thesis will analyse these 
evolving relations. 
 
South Africa has strong albeit unequal economic relations with Kenya and 
indeed the rest of the continent. South Africa is however able to have 
                                               
1
“Why Kenya” http://www.information.go.ke/docs/Why%20Kenya.pdf- Accessed 10/ 
07/2007 
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meaningful relations with other countries such as Nigeria where relations are 
not limited to economic engagement and bi-lateral commissions (Adebajo, 
2007). South Africa and Nigeria, especially under  President Olusengun 
Obasanjo expressed a mutual commitment to the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), work closely to help find 
solutions in conflict ridden areas (Daniel et al, 2005), (Hattingh, 2007). For 
instance, South African negotiators played roles behind- the- scenes in Cote 
d’ Ivoire even before they were invited by the AU to help find solutions to the 
political impasse in 2004 (Lamin, 2005). The thesis will pay attention to how 
the South Africa and Kenya have interacted with each other in the South 
Sudanese peace process, where General Sumbeiywo suggested that South 
Africa was overtaking a process that Kenya had invested in over a long period 
(Waihenya, 2006). 
 
This thesis asks relevant questions which will help broaden our understanding 
of South Africa’s Africa foreign policy by examining whether: 
• Historical factors have a strong bearing on South Africa’s post 1994 
foreign policy direction or not. 
• South Africa- Kenya foreign relations are affected by economic issues, 
• South Africa and Kenya are political and economic rivals, or 
• Whether there is a tacit consensus on the division of labour between 
South Africa and Kenya when it comes to the resolution of conflicts in 
the East African region or, 
• Whether the two countries have different ideals which make co 
operation less likely or whether there are other forces at play (e.g. 
leadership and personality). 
 
Theoretical background: 
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According to Nossal (1998), theory helps us make sense of the world, 
shaping assumptions and thereby helping us understand complex 
phenomena by simplifying it. The way one perceives South African foreign 
policy towards the rest of Africa largely depends on ones theoretical 
positioning. 
 
The next section shall provide a brief explanation of traditional 
international relations theories and how they assist in the comprehension 
of South Africa’s Africa foreign policy. As far as traditional international 
relations is concerned, some (Dunn and Shaw, 2001) have argued that 
these theories are inadequate in helping us understand African 
international relations and by extension, foreign policies. The thesis shall 
however draw from traditional international relations theories to help in the 
investigation of South Africa’s relations with Kenya specifically but also to 
reflect on relations with Africa in general. The thesis shall thus show what 
traditional theories can and cannot explain with regard to South Africa’s 
Africa relations. 
 
Realism: 
Sabine and Thorson (1973), explain that realism perceives international 
relations as being comprised of competing nation states and that 
aggressive competition between states can lead to war. Although African 
states do not wage war against each other (Dunn and Shaw, 2001), 
tension has been evident in the economic front especially in the late 
1990s, which was named by the media as beer wars. Realists would argue 
that issues of national interests and competition for regional markets have 
been that cause for ‘lukewarm’ relations between South Africa and Kenya. 
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Nossal (1998) asserts that realism portrays the world realistically, where 
each state pursues its own interests and should always be on guard 
against other self-interested (state-) actors in international relations. 
Realists would note Kenya’s cautiousness about South Africa’s 
involvement in diplomacy within the region, as was the case in South 
Sudan (Waihenya, 2006). 
 
Jackson and Sorensen (2003) argue that this is a pessimistic view of 
international relations, wherein national security and state survival are the 
most important foreign policy considerations. Jackson and Sorensen 
suggest that for realists, power is very important and the state is a central 
player in world politics. It should be noted however that African states are 
weak, especially with regards to global politics (Dunn and Shaw, 2001). 
Regional ‘powers’ like South Africa and Kenya are, however, important 
actors in the continent, especially with the rise of rhetoric on the African 
century. 
 
The primary aim of foreign policy is to “project and defend the interests of 
the state in world politics” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 68).  Landsberg 
explains that the realist interpretation of South Africa’s Africa foreign policy 
show that South Africa is in search for a regional hegemonic position 
(Landsberg, 2006). Realist thinking places issues of national interests 
above all other considerations. 
 
Hattingh (2007) argues that African National Congress’ foreign policy is 
based on the ambition to expand and promote South Africa’s business 
interests in the rest of the continent and not on Pan- Africanism nor anti- 
imperialism, this he argues is because the state’s interests are fused with 
those of the business class. Indeed le Roux (2004) explains that some 
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have questioned whether the African Renaissance which drives South 
Africa’s foreign policy is a genuine Pax Africana (where African solutions 
to African problems are found) or whether it is merely a Pax Pretoriana 
(i.e. an extension of South Africa’s Africa policy) disguised, which implies a 
realist engagement with the continent. 
 
According to Nel and van der Westhuizen (2004), South Africa’s 
commitment to the promotion of human rights has been largely questioned 
due to its involvement in the arms trade with countries in conflict like 
Rwanda and Uganda. This view places emphasis on South Africa’s 
national interests as contradicting its commitment to peaceful conflict 
resolution. It seemed at this point that claims to ‘morality’ fall off when 
national interests are at stake. Realists in this sense have concluded that 
South Africa is a normal state whose primary concern is the security of its 
national interest. 
 
South Africa is however cautious of the ‘big- brother’ perceptions on the 
continent and has opted to act within a multilateral environment. In South 
Sudan their involvement was through the invitation of the AU and was in 
support of regional initiatives such as the IGAD, especially as an observer 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2003). Pure realist explanations of South 
Africa’s foreign policy towards Kenya and indeed Africa are thus 
inadequate. 
 
Liberalism: 
Liberalism puts emphasis on individual rights, which form the bases for a 
modern civil society, democratic state and capitalist economy (Jackson 
and Sorensen, 2003). International relations is thus not about power 
struggles between nation states but states, groups and individuals. The 
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significant difference is that societies are able to cooperate for the 
common good. Some (like Ezeoha and Uche, 2005) have located South 
Africa’s aim to promote democracy through the African renaissance project 
within a liberal school of thought. 
 
Compared to the realists, liberals generally take a more optimistic view of 
human nature, thus an inherent belief in human progress (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 2003; Nossal, 1998). Jackson and Sorensen explain that 
sociological liberalism holds that international relations cannot be limited to 
state interactions but also involves transnational groups and international 
institutions. According to Landsberg, the liberal view of South Africa’s 
foreign policy relations with Africa sees South Africa as acting in ‘good 
faith to promote peace and prepare the way for democracy (Landsberg, 
2006). Hughes (2006) notes that policymakers in South Africa believe that 
the democratic experience can be exported through the promotion of 
negotiations and accommodation as a means of resolving differences and 
finding peaceful resolutions in conflict areas such as the DRC and Sudan. 
 
Post apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy (especially under Mandela) has 
been articulated as prioritising issues of human rights. Van Nieuwkerk (2006) 
argues that the move away from Mandela’s universalism towards the 
promotion of neo-liberal norms and values positions South Africa to be able to 
prioritise its national interests. It is thus possible to pursue national interests 
through co operation and negotiation as opposed to war. It is in this context 
that the idea of the African Renaissance and the multilateral strategy can be 
understood. For some, South Africa has emphasised the promotion of norms 
and values through the African Renaissance project (Baregu and Landsberg, 
2002); (Gelb, 2002). 
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Schoeman (2000) cites Robert Cox’s conceptualisation that middle powers 
like South Africa are closely linked to international organisation as a process. 
They have an interest in a stable and orderly environment and thus help 
sustain the system, though they do not have the power to (unilaterally) impose 
any of their own preconceived ideas on the system. He explains that middle 
powers can only exert power at a multilateral level, building consensus on 
issues. South Africa as a middle power supports peace and security 
initiatives, is active in international organisations, acts as bridge builders and 
often feels that it needs to be a ‘good global’ citizen since its foreign policy 
has a focus on conflict resolution, promotion of democracy and the protection 
of human rights (Hughes, 2006). South Africa is able to work with other actors 
in the continent. Liberal conceptualisations of South Africa’s foreign policy on 
their own, unfortunately, are not able to adequately capture the issue of 
national interests which ultimately drives foreign policies. 
 
Marxism: 
According to Sabine and Thorson (1973), Marx’s theory elaborates on class 
struggles in the production and distribution processes. The means of 
production are owned by the capitalists, who then keep the profits to 
themselves. Jackson and Sorensen (2003) explain that Marx believed that 
capitalism was inherently exploitative i.e. that the bourgeoisie class depended 
on the exploitation of the proletariat to accrue profits. The Marxist 
conceptualisation shows that political struggle exists not just between states 
or people but between the different classes, so inequalities exist within and 
across states (Nossal, 1998). For Marxists, imperialism is understood as the 
last stage in capitalist development, allowing the imperialist to pay better 
wages at home hence neutralising the domestic proletariat by exploiting the 
poor in foreign lands (a form of colonialism). Democracy is viewed as an 
‘effective’ way of dealing with contradictions of factors of production.  Politics 
and economics, though not separate form the contesting ground for class 
struggles (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). 
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Landsberg explains that for Marxists South Africa’s foreign policy and 
valued diplomacy with the rest of the continent is viewed merely as 
preparing the way for the capitalist class to reap profits (Landsberg, 2006). 
Tleane (2005) makes reference to South African companies, media, and 
information communications technologies which are making the ‘Great 
Trek’ north of the Limpopo in search for profits. Although Kenya is an 
economic powerhouse in the East African region, South Africa’s relatively 
advanced products pose a threat to both its domestic and regional 
markets. 
 
Swatuk (2000) noted that even within the region, South Africa is once 
again emerging as the “bully of the block” where opinions from beyond its 
own borders are disregarded. The point expressed by Swatuk shows that 
although there are vociferous claims of acting within multilateral structures 
by South African foreign policy makers, as a regional hegemon the country 
finds it hard to operate in an atmosphere where there are disagreements 
on the direction of regional and continental locomotives. The regional 
hegemonic role exposes South Africa’s ambition to lead the continent into 
its desired future. This view holds that South Africa has defined interest 
which it aims to pursue, using African Renaissance rhetoric. 
 
According to Buhlungu, South African companies have done little to 
observe ethics in the DRC. South African companies were extracting 
resources while the country was embroiled in war during 1996 and 1998 
(Buhlungu, et al., 2007). Simon (2001) explains that South African firms 
have been accused of exploitation and neo-colonialism. This for neo-
Marxists is not surprising since capitalism is inherently exploitative and 
disregards local people in its search for profits. Those who hold the view 
that South Africa is a sub-imperialist (such as Patrick Bond) are thus not 
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‘deceived’ by the African Renaissance project. Infact its deep consistency 
and compatibility with the neo-liberal project proves to them that global 
capital acts in unity to achieve profit maximization, through partnerships of 
the bourgeois class throughout the world at the expense of the proletariat. 
The Marxist conceptualization of South Africa’s foreign policy towards 
Kenya and indeed the rest of Africa unfortunately limit the question of 
national interests to class struggles. Furthermore; it undermines the efforts 
for multilateral engagements and partnerships in promotion of peace and 
development. 
 
Background and Context: 
Post apartheid South Africa has consciously chosen to relate to the continent 
differently from its predecessors. Pfister (2005) explains that apartheid South 
Africa’s policy towards the Southern African region was one of ‘destabilisation’ 
following from its domestic policy since it wanted to punish those in the  
frontline states that supported the liberation movements. During apartheid, the 
Southern African region was useful to South Africa only in so-far-as it 
provided the country with ‘labour reserves’ in the mining, agricultural and 
industrial sectors (Adebajo, 2007). 
 
Hentz (2005) explains that during the Cold War era, South Africa posed as a 
‘buffer zone’ against communist penetration in the region and continent. 
Pfister (2005) explains that relations with the continent were further influenced 
by the desire to neutralise anti- apartheid sentiments, articulated in the 
Organisation of African Unity (now African Union). Neutralising support was 
aimed at helping the country’s damaged international reputation and to 
hopefully motivate the international community to relax sanctions against the 
apartheid regime. At this stage, the ANC (a key liberation movement) was 
also lobbying for African support against the apartheid regime which was 
founded on undemocratic principles. Although Kenya was a member of the 
 16 
African Union, its involvement in the promotion of sanctions against apartheid 
South Africa was weak, compared to that of Tanzania (Ogweno, 1986) and 
Nigeria (d’ Orville, 1995). This was complicated by the fact that during the cold 
war, Kenya’s leanings were more towards the West, complicating relations 
with South African liberation movements which were branded as communists. 
 
As the Cold War drew to an end, political dynamics in South Africa also 
shifted. F. W de Klerk announced the release of political prisoners like Nelson 
Mandela. Chhabra (1997) explains that soon after his release, both Mandela 
and de Klerk engaged in meetings with leaders in Africa and abroad, lobbying 
for different conditions. De Klerk wanted the relaxation of sanctions and the 
acceptance of the National Party’s legitimacy; while Mandela argued that 
sanctions were necessary until real democratic transition took place in South 
Africa. 
 
It was during this time in June 1991 when South Africa’s F W de Klerk and his 
delegation visited Kenya for a meeting with President Daniel arap Moi. The 
visit was described by the South African media as the “biggest top- level” 
meeting with another African state since 1948. At an OAU Meeting in Abuja, 
Moi was among the leaders who argued for a more flexible approach to South 
Africa as a result of the political changes that were already taking place 
(Wren, 1991).  
 
At home, the leaders continued to hold different talks on the nature of the 
transition. The talks culminated in 1994 when the country had its first 
democratic elections and the ANC emerged as the victor. Since 1994, the 
‘new’ South Africa presented itself as being part of the rest of the continent 
and not different from it. The thesis will analyse this re-integration project and 
how relations, specifically Kenya can be understood. The South African 
 17 
political leadership expressed that the country’s destiny is no longer 
separated from that of the region and continent (Barber, 2005). 
 
During the Mandela era (1994- 1999), South Africa’s foreign policy was often 
criticised for lacking a clear structure (Chhabra, 1997). Given its domestic 
experience, issues of human rights became central to South Africa’s foreign 
policy. Mandela was primarily concerned about the idea of universal human 
rights (Barber, 2005).  During this period, South Africa took a strong stance 
against dictatorial and abusive regimes. In 1996 Mandela called for sanctions 
against Sani Abacha’s Nigeria after the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and 
other Ogoni environmental activists (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and 
Landsberg, 2003). South Africa’s position was, however, not welcomed by 
other African leaders. South Africa which had withdrawn its High 
Commissioner in Nigeria was, in reality, embarrassed when the West 
continued to buy Nigerian oil and the African countries ignored its voice 
(Barber, 2005). Soon after that incident South Africa was largely excluded 
from peace initiatives in the continent. 
South Africa was also viewed as a unilateral actor, posing as having a moral 
high ground. Kabemba explains that when other Southern African states sent 
troops to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo to help Laurent 
Kabila from being ousted by invading forces, South Africa chose to remain 
neutral (Kabemba 2007). Its non-action in the DRC is often contrasted with its 
intervention (albeit within the frameworks of SADC) in Lesotho to abort a 
military coup in 1998. Some like Bond have gone on to question South 
Africa’s motives in Lesotho; thus denying South Africa’s proclaimed moral 
imperatives in the practice of foreign policy (Leys, 2005). Others (Baregu and 
Landsberg, 2003; Nel and Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Landsberg, 2006) have 
questioned why South Africa would supply arms in conflict areas, as it did in 
Rwanda and Uganda. While Mandela relied on his “personality and aura”, 
Mbeki relied on quiet diplomacy, engaging warring factions behind the scenes 
(Landsberg, 2006: 122). 
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The Mbeki administration has gone beyond Mandela’s focus on human rights, 
integrating issues of human rights with democracy and good governance 
(Barber, 2005). Some (like Hughes, 2006) describe how issues of 
international political and economic inequality have become more significant 
under the Mbeki regime. During South Africa’s early years of democracy until 
2002, Kenya was undergoing a period of internal political transition when 
people demanded democracy from the regime of President Daniel arap Moi 
(Bujra, 2005) and was thus largely internally focused. 
While Kenya is home of most international organisations, South Africa is 
viewed as the bridge builder between the North and South in international 
relations (Schoeman, 2000). While South Africa under Mbeki has contributed 
to peacekeeping missions, it has also been active in calling upon the United 
Nations Security Council and the G-8 to fund peace missions in Africa while 
most of the troops are provided by African countries (Landsberg, 2006). South 
Africa has also committed to supplying peace troops and by 2005, it had 
already committed 3, 000 troops in African peace missions (Barber, 2005). 
Kenya is active in the East African region and it is thus important to consider 
how it has perceived South Africa’s role in that region. 
The Mbeki administration has made a conscious decision to be a part of the 
continent and to engage with other leaders before making decisions. This has 
resulted in a shift away from unilateral decisions towards a multilateral foreign 
policy (Buhlungu, et al., 2007). It is in this sense that South Africa’s quiet 
diplomacy towards Zimbabwe can be understood. South Africa has made it 
clear that foreign policy decisions concerning the region and the continent will 
be made within the structures of the SADC and the AU. Some foreign policy 
writers have focused on South Africa’s relations with Nigeria and the 
partnership towards realising the vision of a new Africa (Baregu and 
Landsberg, 2003). This vision presupposes that good governance and sound 
economic policies must be implemented in line with the New Partnership of 
African Development. 
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Both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations have viewed the promotion of 
democratic peace and stability in the continent as paramount. Peace, stability 
and democracy are necessary for development in the continent (DFA, 2007). 
Democratic peace in South Africa alone is not sufficient for Africa’s 
development (Landsberg, 2006).  South Africa has been active in peace 
missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (with successes in the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue in 2002, and the elections in 2006), Sudan (through an 
African Union invitation), and Burundi, specifically in the Arusha process in 
2000 and beyond (Hughes, 2006). 
Throughout the continent, South Africa has been active in the promotion of 
conflict resolution through negotiation to promote democratic peace (Adebajo, 
2007). It is important to note that South Africa under Mbeki engaged other 
African leaders in promotion of peaceful resolution, as was the case when 
DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania were involved in helping brokering 
peace in Central Africa (Landsberg, 2006). 
The East African region is one of the areas which present disconcerting 
challenges for peace and stability in Africa. The effects of September 11th,      
2001 have worsened security dynamics in East Africa. The end of the cold 
war has created a security vacuum since Western powers have withdrawn 
their intervention as was evident in Somalia(1993) and Rwanda(1994), thus 
creating an opportunity for African ‘hegemons’ to play active roles (Adebajo, 
2007).  Though South Africa’s post- 999 foreign policy has been largely 
multilateral, Mbeki considers strategic partnerships with key countries as 
important (Adebajo, 2007). 
Kenya has shown a willingness to be part of the African revival by 
participating in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which aims to 
improve the quality of governance in the continent (APRM country report, 
2006). Kenya has through the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) been an active participant in promoting peace and stability in the 
region (ISS, 2004). 
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While South Africa argued that Tanzania be included in the DRC talks 
because it is affected by conflict in the Great Lakes (Landsberg, 2006), the 
same case was not made for Kenya which is also affected by conflicts in 
neighbouring countries, including Sudan and Somalia. It however makes 
sense that South Africa naturally engages with Tanzania and the DRC 
because they are members of SADC and hence constitute foreign policy 
priorities. Kenya is already very active in mediating talks in Sudan and 
Somalia. The fact that Kenya is pivotal and occupies a position similar to that 
of Nigeria in West Africa (economic strength and relative political stability, 
prior to December 2007), forms the basis of the investigation into South 
Africa’s relations with Kenya. 
Given the new membership of Rwanda and Burundi into the East African 
community, one would assume that Kenya will have an even bigger role to 
play in the promotion of peace and stability in those countries.  Given Kenya’s 
relative political stability and economic strength in the region, as well as its 
leading role in promoting conflict resolution, one would expect that South 
Africa and Kenya would be natural partners. This has not been the case. It is 
against this backdrop that the thesis will investigate foreign relations between 
South Africa and Kenya. 
Method: 
This will be an investigative thesis on the nature of South Africa’s foreign 
policy with Kenya. A general analysis of South Africa’s Africa foreign relations 
will be provided in this thesis. The thesis will thus rely on primary and 
secondary sources, as well as media reports. Traditional international 
relations theories will be reflected upon to see if they are able to explain South 
Africa’s foreign policy relations with Kenya. 
Given the fact that there is a dearth of information pertaining to South Africa’s 
specific relations with Kenya, the paper will make use of interviews. Interviews 
were conducted both in South Africa and Kenya. Interviews were conducted 
with journalists, researchers and government officials. A set of questions 
designed to probe the political and economic dynamics were used. 
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Interviewees were able to provide information about the study that is not 
abundantly available in the primary sources. It should be noted however that 
due to the unstable political condition in Kenya during the period of writing, 
some of the potential interviewees were not available for the interviews. 
The thesis also made extensive use of media reports in order substantiate 
primary sources and interviews. The media plays an important role in 
capturing information about relations between nations and thus a proper 
analysis of international relations would have to consider the media reports of 
the day.  
 
Chapter 2: The evolution of South Africa’s Africa foreign policy 
relations, with reference to Kenya. 
This Chapter will provide a historical overview of South Africa’s relations with 
Kenya. The Chapter shall explain the evolution of South Africa- Africa foreign 
relations. It shall thus provide an analysis of South Africa’s post apartheid 
foreign policy towards the rest of the continent.  
The story of how Kenya became a protectorate for the British Empire is very 
similar to that of South Africa where the White settlers fought the indigenous 
people, alienated them from the political system and then chose the best 
lands for themselves (Ndegwa, 2006).  Ndegwa describes how the Crown 
Lands Ordinance of 1902 gave the protectorate authority over Kenyan lands, 
leaving a lot of Africans ‘landless’.  The land question formed the background 
for liberation struggles in both Southern and Eastern Africa. The Tomlinson 
Commission in South Africa, Morris Carter Commission of Zimbabwe and 
Kenya’s Swynnerton Commission all sought to protect White commercial 
interests (Kariuki, 2004). Indeed the land question remains a thorny issue not 
just for Zimbabwe and Kenya but also South Africa. 
Wheeler (2005) explains that in 1927, R. B. Turner (of the Union of SA Trade 
Commissioner for British East Africa Territories’) advised Hertzog on the new 
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commission to investigate closer association between territories. Links 
between South Africa and the East Africa region, specifically Kenya grew 
stronger in 1928.  Bilateral trade was also to be promoted to cater for South 
African interests. Exports from South Africa to Kenya and the rest of East 
Africa were in ‘mining equipment, wine and dried fruit; while imports were in 
sisal fibre, twine and rubber latex liquid’ (Wheeler, 2005: 157). 
 
The relations between the two British protectorates were reinforced by the fact 
that there was movement of White South Africans into Kenya. According to 
Ndegwa (2006), the White settlers who moved into Kenya included ruthless 
South Africans who according to Ndengwa used sjamboks and racist 
language to dispossess and force people to work on their farms.  Wheeler 
(2005) confirms that after the treaty of Vereeniging, some farmers left South 
Africa for the East African highlands. He notes that by 1938 rough estimates 
showed that South African settlers contributed 20% of the European 
population in Kenya, most of who were farmers. 
When Kenya became independent in 1963 most White South Africans were 
quick to return to South Africa where much had not changed at the time. 
About 100 farmers and their families were reported to have migrated from the 
Kenya White Highlands, with even more were expected to follow (DFA 
Archives, 1962). The general feeling was that these White farmers felt 
betrayed by the British and were welcome in Verwoerd’s (racist) South Africa 
(DFA Archives, 1962). Before independence Black South Africans and Black 
Kenyans experienced a similar kind of domination. It is against this backdrop 
that one would have expected that independent Kenya would have played a 
more prominent role in the liberation of South Africa. The next sub- section 
focuses specifically on the relations between apartheid South Africa and 
independent Kenya and Africa. 
 
 
 23 
Pan Africanism, non- interference and sovereign integrity: 
As mentioned above, Kenya became politically independent from Britain in 
1963. According to Pfister (2005), newly independent state’ expressed a 
willingness to support fellow Africans who were still living under domination. 
He explains that within the UN, these independent states formed what was 
called the African Group to push for a UN arms embargo against the 
apartheid regime. After the Sharpville killings in South Africa, the group 
demanded that the Security Council set an arms embargo which was 
amended in United Nations Security Council Resolution 181. Pfister (2005) 
explains that the apartheid governments’ response was to appease African 
countries to defuse the Pan Africanist voice. 
With regard to Kenya, Howell (1968)  argues that newly independent Kenya’s 
foreign policy was built on three pillars, which can be identified as ‘non- 
alignment’, the promotion of ‘African unity’ and the ‘eradication of colonialism’ 
in other parts of the continent, in line with the principles of the Organisation of 
African Unity. From independence, the Kenyan foreign policy was analysed to 
fall under the following pillars: ‘good neighbourliness and peaceful co-
existence, non- interference in another country’s internal affairs, respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, national security, peaceful settlements of 
disputes, non- alignment and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations 
and the African Union. Perhaps it was the principle of ‘non- interference’ 
which limited Kenya from playing a more robust role in South Africa’s 
liberation struggle. Foreign policy has evolved to focus on ‘economic 
diplomacy, peace diplomacy and environment diplomacy’ (MFA, 2007).  
 
Pfister (2005) explains that even the issue of dialogue with apartheid South 
Africa was extensively debated within the ranks of the Organisation of African 
Unity and was rejected on grounds that South Africa needs to first put its 
house in order by giving equal rights to the Black majority before it could be 
accepted by other African states. Leopold Senghor for instance insisted that 
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dialogue between South Africa and the rest of the continent ‘must only’ occur 
if South Africa was prepared to enter into a dialogue with its Black majority. 
 
The Pan Africanist voice was perhaps most typified by Ghana’s Kwame 
Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, despite their differences in strategy. 
Pan Africanism was an ideology that promoted African Unity and solidarity 
with those who were still in bondage, as was the case in most of Southern 
Africa (Agyeman, 1992).  Though Nkrumah’s voice (and support) resounded 
in most parts of the continent, Nyerere was the most active African leader 
supporting liberation movements in Southern Africa. 
Agyeman (1992) explains that the East African Pan Africanists differed with 
Nkrumah on the nature of regionalism with Nkrumah seeing it as a threat to 
continental unity and uncalled for when most of the continent was still under 
domination. While he envisioned immediate union, Nyerere and the leaders in 
East Africa preferred a gradualist process. 
Another point of difference between Nkrumah and the East Africans, 
particularly Kenya was the nature of non- alignment. For Nkrumah, non- 
alignment was a means for protest against the East- West division in 
international relations (at least in the early stages). Initially, Africa was to 
avoid taking sides. Tom Mboya from Kenya on the other hand saw no 
problem with positive alignment where African states could have an affiliation 
with international trade unions.  Mboya saw disaffiliation as actually isolation 
and not neutralism as Nkrumah did. At this point, the Kenyan Federation of 
Labour was funded by the International Conference of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) with up to 12 thousand British pounds per annum. The ICFTU was 
itself a Western umbrella of trade unions (Agyeman, 1992), bringing into 
question the nature of the non- alignment. 
According to Howell (1968), radicals like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga claimed 
that independent Kenya’s foreign policy was very much influenced by imperial 
powers. The claim was supported by the fact that Kenya had adopted a 
 25 
‘hardening attitude’ towards the Eastern bloc thus causing doubt among the 
radicals of the ‘non- alignment’ principle.  He explains that the ruling party’s 
response was that those making such claims were themselves influenced by 
foreign (communist) forces and did not represent the legitimate voice in 
Kenya. 
 
Colonialism was not only exploitative but also prepared independent Kenya to 
become a neo- colony with leaders imitating the capitalist ruling class. 
Independent Kenya inherited an exclusive economy where only a minority 
(albeit multiracial in the post independence era) benefited from economic 
growth (Anonymous, 1982). Howell (1968) noted that independent Kenya’s 
position was more compromising (especially on the issue of Rhodesia) 
towards the Britons because it was dependent on it for trade and aid.  He 
continued to note that foreign policy in Kenya was such that it would not 
damage relations with important (aid- giving) countries. According to this 
analysis support for liberation movements was managed carefully so as to 
avoid offending strategic trade partners. 
 
In the 1970s, Kenya had an obvious open policy towards international capital; 
militant nationalist voices were labelled as communist puppets. It is important 
to note that this was at a time when apartheid South Africa labelled liberation 
groups as communists and actually used the ‘bulwark’ argument to argue that 
South Africa was defending itself against communist penetration (Hentz, 
2005).  
Before independence Kenya was a member of the Pan- African Freedom 
Movement of East and Central Africa which became the Pan- African 
Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in 
1962. One of the objectives of the movement according to its constitutional 
provision 2(b) was to unite Eastern, Central and Southern Africa against 
imperialism, domination and White supremacy through nationalist activities 
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intended to attain self- government (Cox, 1964). Although independent Kenya 
continued to profess commitment to the liberation of other Africans who were 
still under imperialism and minority rule, such a commitment was not as 
strong as that of radical nationalist states like Tanzania, especially with 
regards to Southern Africa. PAFMECSA was crucial in consolidating 
nationalist leaders in Zanzibar, Uganda and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It also led 
the boycott against apartheid South Africa and supported various Southern 
African refugee groups among other successes (Cox, 1964). Cox further 
explains that the movement was able to have a voice in the international 
system by advocating for the adoption of a UN resolution against South 
Africa. 
It was through this movement that “… Labour movements in East Africa were 
asked to submit detailed plans for a boycott by all the transport unions, and 
importers and manufacturers’ agents to cease assisting in the sale of South 
African goods anywhere in East and Central Africa. Unlike some larger 
nations that have loudly proclaimed the boycott whilst having no South African 
trade anyway, the East African territories had an appreciable exchange of 
goods, and the boycott might in the end hurt them more than South Africa. 
The immediate plan agreed was a selective boycott starting in November and 
directed against imported hoes, wines, and spirits, tomatoes and other 
produce” (Cox, 1964: 32-33). 
What is most commendable about PAFMECSA as the quote above shows is 
that they were willing to support those under domination even when it was not 
in their best (economic) interests. Nye (1965) specifically pointed out that the 
trade boycott would hurt Uganda more than it would South Africa since it 
would shut it out of a market for its coffee. Although Kenya was a renowned 
capitalist state, it together with other East African countries in the Legislative 
Assembly supported the boycott against apartheid South Africa in 1962.2 The 
leaders in East Africa decided on a ban against the South African Airways, 
denying it landing rights in the region in 1963.3 This is despite the expectation 
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 DFA archives 24. 1/135/3, vol. 12 
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 The Star Johannesburg, Tuesday May 14, 1963, DFA archives 24. 1/135/3, vol. 12 
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by South Africa at the time that Kenya was likely to turn a blind eye when it 
comes to hard business.4 There is no concrete evidence to show that that 
Nairobi did not boycott South African goods since the Pan Africanist 
leadership proclaimed anti- apartheid stances. Nationalists like Julius Nyerere 
were more willing to compromise possible national interests for the sake of 
liberation struggles in Southern Africa. 
 
In response to continental alienation, the Botha regime (1978- 1989), was 
dominated by military action, against domestic dissenters but also the Front 
Line Sates who supported freedom fighters (Pfister, 2005). Pfister explains 
that in an economic move, Armscor (established after the 1963 UN arms 
embargo) became advanced in arms manufacturing and was keen to supply 
arms in conflict ridden areas such as Sudan and Somalia. Pfister (2005) notes 
that it was however hesitant to supply arms to Somalia because it did not 
want to jeopardise relations with Kenya and in 1981, the apartheid 
government resolved the issue by deciding that Somalia was not a priority. 
The implication of Pfister’s analysis was that Kenya was an important African 
trading partner for South Africa. 
 
According to Ogot (1995), in the 1980s Kenya went through a period of 
economic decline worsened by the oil crises in 1979, the collapse of the East 
African Community, drought contributing to food shortages and fluctuating 
prices given by the poor economic conditions. Kenya’s response was to 
embrace structural adjustment policies to generally ensure self-sufficiency in 
food production in the hope to deal with the financial crises. The Kenyan 
Communists were quick to accuse Kenya of having economic contact with 
pro- capitalist regimes, at a time when government professed non-alignment. 
The supposed trade was in $ 30 million worth of food aid from the USA and 
imports in maize, wheat, rice and milk in 1982 from the USA, South Africa, 
Australia and other places (Communist Journal, 1982). 
                                               
4
 The Star Johannesburg, 22 May 1963, DFA archives 24. 1/135/3, vol. 12 
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Their position can be contrasted against that of Nigeria which maintained a 
consistent stance even against its national interests. Nigeria’s stance against 
the apartheid regime in particular was consistent throughout South Africa’s 
liberation struggle. Most Southern African refugees and liberation leaders 
were given asylum in Nigeria, including South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki who in 
1976 was the ANC’s chief representative in Nigeria (Hadland and Rantao, 
1999). 
Nigeria, an economically important African country at the time was particularly 
useful in pressuring the West against the apartheid regime. Given its status as 
the largest African oil supplier to the United States, large consumer base and 
growing economy at the time, it was able to press against trade and 
investment with apartheid South Africa by any state that desired to have trade 
and investment relations with it (Herskovits, 1977- 1978). 
At a United Nations Conference against apartheid in Lagos, then Lieutenant 
Obasanjo expressed that: “The intransigence of minority regimes [in Southern 
Africa] has created a situation whereby we have to use every weapon in our 
armoury to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. 
We are compelled in these circumstances to insist that those whose economic 
activities in these territories help to keep the minority regimes afloat cannot be 
our friends and should not expect to be able to profitably do business with 
us… We are screening all foreign contractors and business firms with a view 
to discriminating against all those who have business relations with Rhodesia, 
and South Africa… Such business firms are, however, free to discontinue this 
relationship or at least do nothing to expand it, if they feel their bread is better 
buttered on our side. Investors and businessmen are hardheaded calculators 
and I will leave you to decide and choose…”- Adapted in (Herskovis, 1977-
1978: 168). 
 
 29 
Herskovis notes that on another occasion Nigeria was reported by a South 
African Journalist to have required a West German company which wanted to 
secure a contract in Nigeria to first show proof that it was cutting back 
investment in South Africa. Nigeria further provided financial support through 
what was known as the South African Relief Fund which provided non- 
military support (Herskovits, 1977- 1978). It is such scrutiny which reflected 
seriousness about the liberation of Africans who were still under minority rule. 
 
Nigeria’s commitment to the liberation of South Africa was further noted by 
(then General) Obasanjo’s willingness to Chair the Commonwealth’s Eminent 
Persons Group on South Africa in 1986 which was formed to help find a 
peaceful solution to the political problems related to racial exclusion and was 
able to form a background which paved the path for domestic negotiations (d’ 
Orville, 1995). 
 
Tanzania’s support also deserves special mention. Ogweno (1986) argues 
that European powers with interests in South Africa turned a blind eye to 
minority rule in South Africa, an attitude which Nyerere adamantly opposed. 
Ogweno further explains that Tanzania sacrificed financial support for 
development by its harsh attitude against the West (Britain, USA, West 
Germany and France). Tanzania went as far as breaking diplomatic relations 
with Britain over the Rhodesia crises and pushed for the expulsion of South 
Africa from the Commonwealth. He argued that Rhodesia and South Africa 
violated the Commonwealth’s principles by their racist and apartheid policies 
that denied human dignity and respect to the majority of the people’s in those 
countries. 
 
For Tanzania, apartheid was a threat to international peace and security. 
Ogweno explains that by pursuing such a foreign policy, Tanzania was able to 
 30 
use ideological considerations (African unity, Pan Africanism, advancing the 
liberation of Southern Africa and morality) over narrow self- interests. 
Tanzania’s strategy, however, did not achieve assurance from other African 
states that they will do the same. The OAU decision in 1965 was not binding, 
hence other African states such as Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and 
Zambia as well as non- Common Wealth African states did not cut diplomatic 
relations with Britain. Consistent with its support for liberation struggles in 
South Africa, Tanzania offered ‘diplomatic and moral support to ANC and 
PAC freedom fighters (Ogweno, 1986). 
 
This sub- section showed that the concept of Pan Africanism promoted the 
idea of genuine liberation for all Africans. It was however too broad, allowing 
African states to make their own foreign policy decisions. Kenya’s role was 
affected by its close contact with the West and its capitalist posture.  Kenya’s 
role in South Africa’s liberation struggle was thus minimal compared to that of 
Nigeria and its own neighbour, Tanzania. Given the background of similar 
struggles that the Africans in both countries endured, one would have 
expected that Kenya would be at the forefront of the support for liberation in 
South Africa. Current relations between post apartheid South Africa and 
Kenya are described by the foreign Affairs Departments as ‘cordial’ but 
foreign policy analysts have not focused much on Kenya. To assume that this 
is because of Kenya’s historical lukewarmness would be a poor analysis. It is 
therefore important to understand the nature of post apartheid South Africa’s 
Africa foreign policy before any analysis of its current relations with Kenya is 
made.  
 
The nature of South Africa’s post apartheid Africa foreign policy 
It is important to briefly indicate that the pre- 1994 South African foreign policy 
was characterised by the desire to end sanctions and isolationist policies 
adopted by other states. This desire was particularly important for South 
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Africa’s trade and commerce. Pfister (2005) shows how South Africa acted as 
a middle power by wanting to be a bridgehead of Western civilisation in Africa 
during the period. South Africa wanted to maintain the permanent white 
minority rule domestically while it needed to co – exist and co operate with 
other African states, but this end was frustrated by both domestic 
insurgencies and the support they received from the Front Line states 
(Henwood, 1997) and the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) 
as a whole. 
Post apartheid South Africa was in a position where the above mentioned 
conditions were no longer active. The post apartheid South Africa which was 
domestically legitimate and internationally accepted was eager to play a 
meaningful role in the continent and the world. 
According to Henwood (1997) South Africa’s post apartheid foreign policy as 
declared by the then Foreign Affairs minister Alfred Nzo, in 1994 was 
committed to: 
• the respect for human rights as well as the political, economic, social 
and environmental circumstances conducive to these; 
• promote freedom and democracy worldwide; 
• uphold the principles of justice and international law in international 
relations; 
• promote international peace and the resolution of conflicts through 
internationally agreed mechanisms; 
• position Africa’s interest  in global affairs and 
• to enhance regional and international economic co-operation. 
 
Post apartheid South Africa wanted to establish its position within the 
continent by playing a meaningful political and economic role.  Landsberg and 
Monyae explain that policymakers in South Africa believe that the democratic 
experience can be exported through the promotion of negotiations and 
accommodation, as a means of resolving differences and finding peaceful 
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resolutions in conflict areas (Landsberg and Monyae., 2006). Venter shows 
that before the ANC even got to power it articulated the prominence of human 
rights. According to Venter, Mandela in 1993 stated that the promotion of 
democracy, justice and respect for international law and human rights would 
be at the centre of South Africa’s future foreign policy (Venter, 2001). 
 
According to Henwood (1997), Nzo disclosed that foreign policy was guided 
by the need for security, the well-being of South Africans, respect for 
international justice, promotion of peace and economic stability, as well as 
regional cooperation, although he also said that South Africa has no intention 
to overstretch itself in international politics because of limited resources. 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy priorities include the promotion of peaceful 
coexistence and economic development in the region, constructive interaction 
with the rest of the continent, and the commitment to multilateralism 
(Landsberg, 2006). Landsberg explains that Pretoria/Tshwane was able to 
push Kabila’s DRC to join SADC so as to allow better control and influence in 
a multilateral sphere. He further explains that when Mbeki entered the scene 
in the DRC (taking over from Mandela), he was able to involve all the main 
actors behind the scenes (Landsberg, 2006). According to Stremlau (2007) 
the suffering of the Congolese people was the focus of Mbeki’s strategy which 
brought in a moral dimension to diplomacy. In April 2002, the Congo Peace 
Accords were signed by the main antagonists in the Congolese conflict, which 
prepared the way for the 2006 vote for peace. Landsberg suggests that in 
Burundi, Zuma (South Africa’s then, Vice President) in 2002 also kept in touch 
with all the players. Talks led to the March 2005 referendum and an election 
in June 2005 (Landsberg, 2006). 
 
 33 
Botha concurs that the 1997 discussion document of the ANC highlighted the 
foreign policy priorities that defined South Africa as part of the continent and 
that its economic development was linked to occurrences and events in the 
continent (Botha, 2000). This means that economic development in South 
Africa is not sustainable if the rest of the continent continues to be plunged in 
wars and conflicts. This concern is justifiable given the nature of refugee 
spillovers which occurs when one’s neighbours are going through periods of 
destabilisation. When peoples’ countries are destabilised, they often flee to 
the nearest place of safety but the unfortunate challenge is that they could put 
pressure on the fragile economic and sometimes political climate in the 
neighbouring countries wherein they seek refuge worsening regional security 
dynamics. 
 
 The post apartheid policy was arguably a decisive break from apartheid 
policy in its respect for human rights for all and seeking Africa’s interests; 
given that a peaceful and prosperous Africa is in South Africa’s interests. Van 
der Ross (2004), points out that South Africa hoped to bring a reconciliatory 
spirit derived from its relatively peaceful democratic transition. In recognising 
its own diversity, South Africa believes that other religiously, and ethnically 
diverse countries could also achieve unity and overcome their differences.  
South Africa’s aim was expressed in the desire to promote an environment 
where the fundamental human rights of all peoples, including minorities are 
protected (Hughes eds., 2006). In this way the country hopes to promote and 
encourage democratic governance, where the will of the people is respected. 
 
Landsberg and Monyae argue that the post apartheid South Africa has 
consciously taken the role of a diplomat, promoting peaceful negotiations and 
putting  emphasis on ‘preventive diplomacy’ (Landsberg and Monyae, 2006). 
An example was given of Mandela’s attempts to broker peace in Angola in 
1994, and in Lesotho (1998), when South Africa together with Botswana and 
Zimbabwe  encouraged elections, employing ‘Operation Boleas’ militarily 
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intervening when other strategies failed. They note that since 1999, South 
Africa has been active in efforts to bring peace, succeeding in ensuring the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2002 followed by elections in 2006. In Burundi, 
South Africa sought to promote peace by strengthening the Arusha Process 
and also acting as a broker in 2004, negotiating a power sharing arrangement 
in 2005, allowing the country to adopt a referendum leading to elections in 
June that year. 
 
Landsberg and Monyae explain that as a bridge-builder, South Africa adopts 
the role of building partnerships with both the North and the South (Landsberg 
and Monyae, 2006). South Africa joined the Non-Aligned Movement as part of 
desiring to negotiate better terms for the countries of the south in the existing 
global order. South Africa encourages South-South bilateral and multilateral 
relations. It is also explained that South Africa engages with the G8 to ensure 
support for NEPAD which is part of an attempt by African leaders to solve 
their own problems Gelb (2002). 
 
In pursuing its foreign policy, South Africa chose to adopt a “commitment to 
active multilateralism”. South Africa challenged institutions like the World 
Trade Organisation, by lobbying for better trade terms for the global South. 
South Africa has been committed to acting within multilateral bodies such bas 
SADC, AU and the United Nations (Hughes, 2006:140). 
 
According to Gelb (2002), South Africa’s post-1994 Africa foreign policy has 
been shaped by among others, the African state’s weakness and their failure 
to economically develop. Gelb further explains that the failure of the African 
state has its foundations in maintaining colonial boundaries which prevented 
the African state from developing from a domestic political process as was the 
case in the West. 
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South Africa is an advocate for a better Southern Africa, a better Africa, a 
better South and a better world in which the interests of the continent would 
be secured. Landsberg and Monyae distinguished between the Mandela 
administration, which was said to “strive for a just world order” (Landsberg 
and Monyae, 2006: 133), placing supremacy on international law; and the 
Mbeki administration which sought for a more equitable political and economic 
world. 
 
South Africa as a mediator- integrator sought to address Africa’s marginalised 
position in the world while promoting ‘regional integration and development’ 
(Landsberg and Monyae, 2006). Contrary to the apartheid predecessors, 
South Africa aimed to play a cautious role in the promotion of mutual regional 
development. South Africa played a key role in the negotiation of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), promoting good governance 
and encouraging sound economic policies in the continent. Gelb (2002) 
explained that state weakness in Africa has been worsened by the global 
unequal distribution of power and globalisation which necessitates the need 
for better governance. Gelb further said that NEPAD was a major driver of 
South Africa’s foreign policy and has been used to promote Africa’s 
significance in global security and welfare. 
Naidu (2007) asserts that the triumph of neo- liberalism meant that the 
continent was going through a period of de- regulation; investors were 
withdrawing from Africa and moving into Eastern Europe, which paved the 
way for South African capital to enter the African market from which it was 
historically excluded. 
 
A realist understanding of South Africa’s post 1994 foreign policy does not 
see beyond narrow interests given by relative economic and military 
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capabilities. This view basically believes in the mercantilist continuation of 
apartheid policies in the region and continent. Core interests are defined in 
terms of increased trade and investment with the aim of enhancing domestic 
growth and job creation (Gelb, 2002). 
 
This view is supported by the evidence that since 1990, South Africa’s trade 
with the continent has increased, with exports to SADC increasing by 15.4% 
per annum in the years between 1992 and 1996 and by 24.2% in the rest of 
Africa. South Africa became Kenya’s largest source of imports in 1997, 
replacing the United Kingdom. The trade deficit between South Africa and the 
rest of the continent has however widened. The trade deficit between Kenya 
and South Africa, for instance, grew from R734 million in 1995 to R1. 5billion 
in 1999. The realist/ mercantilist view advocates that the region and continent 
are markets for South African firms to dispose of the surplus which is not 
absorbed domestically (Gelb, 2002). 
 
If one considers the articulation of South Africa’s foreign policy, it would be 
evident that there is no denial of the fact that national interests play an 
important role in the direction of foreign policy (DFA, 2007). Post apartheid 
South Africa extended its presence economically in the continent beyond 
mining, retail and related industries. According to Roger Southall,  South 
Africa is one of the largest investor in Africa, with companies like Checkers, 
Game, Makro, Truworths, Woolworths, MTN, Transnet, ESKOM, AngloGold 
Ashanti, Randgold Resources, Sasol and PetroSA to name but a few actively 
involved in the rest of the continent (Southall, 2007). 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa emerged as a military and economic powerhouse 
in the region with most neighbouring countries dependent on it. Marxist 
conceptualisations go beyond seeing South Africa as a major investor in the 
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region and continent. Tleane (2005) asks whether South Africa has become 
the regional hegemon in Southern Africa and beyond.  Tleane makes 
reference to South African companies, media, and information 
communications technologies which are making the ‘Great Trek’ north of the 
Limpopo. 
 
Although the middle power position is correct in observing that South Africa 
has been largely involved in peacekeeping operations throughout the 
continent, its engagement in the continent go beyond altruism. The Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Aziz Pahad confirmed that the promotion of 
conflict resolution in Africa is related to sustaining South Africa’s economic 
growth and ensuring expansion into new markets (emphasis added). Indeed 
South Africa has turned out as the biggest investor in Africa at a time when 
Western investors were hesitant to invest in the continent. Between 1990 and 
2000, South Africa’s investment to the rest of the continent was estimated to 
be approximately US $ 1.4 billion annually (Schoeman, 2000). 
 
The criticism given against the realist view is that South Africa is able to 
produce more efficiently than most other firms in the continent, and when they 
sell their surplus to those countries, they destroy local firms and increase 
levels of unemployment. The realist’ counter argument is that increased trade 
from South Africa to the rest of the continent serves as a ‘growth engine’ and 
within SADC is aimed at ‘development integration’ (Gelb, 2002). 
 
The above mentioned conceptualisations reflect on South Africa’s broad 
foreign policy considerations. South Africa’s post apartheid foreign policy is 
neither merely driven by vested national interests nor purely by altruistic 
reasons. South Africa does behave like a normal state, whose interests is 
promoting national interests, but it is also a state whose specific past gives it a 
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disposition towards promoting global equality and the respect for universal 
human rights. Landsberg also concludes that South Africa’s role cannot be 
simply understood as Realist, Liberalist or Marxist but should be understood 
in the broader Pan- African regional geo- strategic context. There is an 
understanding that African development will come with peace, democratic 
governance and growth (Landsberg, 2006) 
The African Renaissance and South Africa’s foreign policy 
Globalisation places an imperative on states to cooperate in an 
interdependent world especially to deal with cross- border spillages such as 
refugees, illegal immigrants, and climatic change. For Gelb, the problem of 
spillages transcends both the realist and liberal/moralist arguments. He further 
argues that the poor economic and political governance in sub- Saharan 
Africa creates a negative image which leads to low investment in the region 
as a whole including South Africa. South Africa’s investment probabilities are 
thus affected by the “Africa dummy”, which the country has an interest in 
addressing; hence the need to promote governance through the African 
Renaissance project (Gelb 2002). Venter says that the African Renaissance is 
part of South Africa’s strategy to promote African renewal and solidarity with 
other African states as well as the rest of the global South to seek fair market 
access (Venter, 2001). 
Botha (2000) argues that the African Renaissance contrary to the European 
counterpart is not a celebration of the past but an aspiration of the future. The 
African Renaissance is a feasible ‘project’ to return the people’s destinies into 
their own hands after being told on a continental scale that they did not have 
anything valuable. Botha argues that politically, the idea of an African 
Renaissance aims to promote democratic ideals and a system of ‘good 
governance’ throughout the continent. Economically, the challenge is to 
remove political and economic corruption and prepare the way for the 
regeneration of African economies (Botha, 2000). 
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Venter and Neuland (2005) however point out that the word renaissance was 
coined by Jules Michet (a French Historian) and used in contrast to the Dark/ 
Middle ages.  In the 20th Century, there were views that Renaissance was 
perhaps one of a series of enlightenment movements. As a result current 
discussion on the renaissance became more specific i.e. the English 
Renaissance, the Italian Renaissance e.t.c. In this way, Renaissance is often 
used interchangeably with the word ‘civilisation’. 
 
Venter and Neuland (2005) further identified a series of Renaissance in Africa 
as; ‘the Ancient Egyptian period (3100- 343 BC), Ancient Carthage (814BC- 
697AD), Trans- Sahara Trade and Development of African Empires (800- 
1100AD), Songhai period (circa 1464- 1600), Mossi Kingdoms (11th- 15thc 
AD), Hausa City States (circa 10th century AD onwards), Karem- Bornu (circa 
8th- 15th centuries AD), the Iron Age South of the Sahara (from 1400 BC), 
Greater Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe (around 1000 AD). They argue that 
common denominators for periods of awakening included political and 
economic structures, social systems and religion, trade and commerce, legal 
systems, architecture, science, technology and manufacturing, writing, 
transport and art. In this way it was obvious to see that Africans have also 
contributed to human civilisation. 
President Mbeki’s call for an African Renaissance can be understood as part 
of the series of awakenings in the political, economic, technological, social 
and cultural development of the continent so that it can be meaningfully 
incorporated in the global system.  The African Renaissance ideology 
recognises the gruesome past the people of the continent experienced under 
domination but also reaffirms that the peoples of Africa could determine their 
own destiny (Venter and Neuland, 2005). 
Maloka shows that the ANC’s strategic perspectives on South African foreign 
policy identified the following essentials of the African Renaissance: 
‘continental recovery, establishing political democracy, breaking dependency 
on world economic powers, mobilising people to take ownership of their 
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future, and the need for development and growth which actually improves 
people’s lives’ (Maloka, 2000). 
 
NEPAD which could be understood as the technical wing of the African 
Renaissance project has been viewed by some as a pan African Marshall 
plan  to half poverty by 2015, reverse factors that hinder growth and move 
away from aid dependency towards investment promotion with engagements 
between states based on mutual interests (Venter and Neuland, 2005). 
NEPAD views conflict resolution, peace and security as conditions for 
sustainable development. It is also acknowledged that there cannot be 
sustainable development without democracy, respect for human rights and 
good governance. African leaders have thus committed themselves through 
NEPAD to meet these principles. The African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) is a voluntary process created to assist states to speed up the 
operation of NEPAD priorities and programmes (Venter and Neuland, 2005). 
 
Venter reiterates that the African Renaissance is part of South Africa’s 
strategy to promote African renewal and to promote solidarity with other 
African states as well as the rest of the global South to seek fair market 
access (Venter, 2001). 
 
Van der Ross however thinks that it is just “heady talk” for the political bigwigs 
in the continent, while the majority still live in dire poverty. He however makes 
use of Fanon’s hypothesis that after being oppressed and taught to have a 
low self-esteem, the oppressed will develop their own intellect, challenging the 
colonialists’ version of reality and constructing their own (Van der Ross, 2004: 
15). 
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As a foreign policy goal the African Renaissance aims to promote ‘genuine’ 
democracy, and good governance which would enable the adoption of sound 
economic policies, promote anti- corruption and guard against human rights 
violations in order to attract investment in the continent (Venter, 2001). 
Landsberg and Monyae (2006) concur that the African Renaissance is a 
banner under which South Africa thinks it can promote democracy, respect for 
human rights and peace and security. The African Renaissance project could 
also be understood as a response to globalisation and an attempt to improve 
Africa’s geopolitical positioning in the world (Botha, 2000). 
 
Botha adds that these elements also include promoting interdependence and 
regional integrated development, promoting respect for human rights and 
justice as part of the African agenda, democratisation and reform of the 
United Nations Security Council and International Financial Institutions such 
as the WTO and the IMF. The African renaissance thus offers a challenge to 
globalisation. The African Renaissance is also a commitment to the promotion 
of gender equality and the empowerment of African women who had been the 
most marginalised in the past (Botha, 2004). It is important to note that this 
requires acting within a multilateral framework. 
 
Chapter 3: Kenya’s position 
This Chapter shall begin by briefly explaining Kenya’s geographical location 
and population dynamics. It shall reflect on the current political ambience, the 
political and economic position that Kenya occupies in the East African region. 
The Chapter shall also reflect on Kenya’s global geo-strategic position.  
Geographical location and population 
Kenya is located in East Africa and borders Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Uganda and Tanzania. The climate varies from tropical along the coast and 
arid in the interior (CIA, 2008). Kenya has a population of 34.7 million, with 
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diverse religious and ethnic groups.5 The large population itself presents a 
wide market for both domestic and foreign investors. Kenya has a land area of 
219, 788sq mi (569, 251sq km) and a total area of 224, 961 sq mi (582, 650 
sq km).6 Approximately 8.8% of the land is arable, 0.98% is used for 
permanent crops and 90. 94% goes to other uses (Sebei, 2006). It would be 
evident later in this thesis that agriculture plays a very significant role in the 
Kenyan economy. 
 
Kenya is a demographically diverse nation; sociolinguistic groups include the 
Bantu (67%), Nilotic (30%), and the Cushitic (3%). Approximately 80% of 
Kenyans are Christians, 10% Muslims and another 10% follow traditional 
African beliefs.7  Kenya is home to more than 40 ethnic groups and had 
previously been able to accommodate these different groups with no inter- 
ethnic violent conflicts. The largest group is the Kikuyu (22%), followed by the 
Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Meru 
(6%), other African (15%), Asian, European and Arab (1%). English and 
Kiswahili are the official languages; other indigenous languages are also 
spoken.8 
 
According to Nyaga (et al. 2004) there are about 42 million people living with 
the HIV/AIDS virus in the world and 29.4 of these live in Sub- Sahara Africa, 
with 8 million orphans in the region. In Kenya the figure was estimated to be 
2.5 million people, Kenya has the ninth highest prevalence rate in Africa. 
 
                                               
5
 Historycentral.com. Nation-By- Nation. Population. 
http://www.multied.com/nationbynation/Kenya/Population.html- Accessed 11/02/2008 
 
6
 “Kenya” http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107678.html- Accessed 24/01/2008.  
7
 “Kenya” http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/kenya.html- Accessed 24/01/2008.  
8
 “Kenya” http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107678.html- Accessed 24/01/2008. 
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The Kenya Economic Survey for 2003 revealed that HIV prevalence in Kenya 
declined from 13% to 10.2% in 2002. HIV/AIDS has negative effects on the 
economy (such as reducing labour productivity) since it mostly affects the 
economically active group. The decline in prevalence percentages has been 
attributed to governments’ and other organisations’ vigorous campaigns. 
These included information campaigns, coordination and mobilisation of funds 
to cope with the pandemic, counselling and support for patients, promoting 
the prevention of prenatal infection, and effective blood screening (Nyaga et 
al., 2004). 
 
The Kenyan government identified HIV/AIDS as a developmental problem, 
thus necessitating incorporation into the Seventh National Development Plan 
and other documents as well as the National Aids Control Council in the office 
of the Presidency. The concerns of gender specific aspects are dealt with by 
the Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000- 2005. The efforts date as 
far back as 1999, when government declared that HIV/AIDS was a national 
disaster (Nyaga et al. 2004). 
 
Politics and governance 
Kenya has a unicameral National Assembly with 210 members elected from 
single member constituencies over a period of 5 years and 12 additional 
members chosen by political parties on the basis of proportional 
representation. The Vice President and Cabinet members are chosen by the 
President from those in the assembly.9 
 
According to Tamarkin (1978) Kenya enjoyed relative political stability and 
economic growth which in the early years was attributed to Jomo Kenyatta’s 
(country’s first independence President) personality. This is despite domestic 
                                               
9
 “Kenya” http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/kenya.html- Accessed 21/01/2008. 
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ethnic tensions fuelled by what most people perceived as the ruling class 
being predominantly from Kikuyu ethnic group. When Daniel arap Moi 
became President, he sought to redress the ethnic imbalance by mostly 
favouring his Kalenjin and other ‘disadvantaged’ tribes from the Rift Valley 
(Barkan, 2004). 
 
A pseudo multiparty democracy was introduced in 1991 due to internal and 
external pressures on the Moi regime. The 1992 and 1997 elections were not 
free and were followed by a number of irregularities (e.g. opposition leaders 
were often arrested and were denied permits for rallies, granting the ruling 
party (KANU) presidential and parliamentary majority (Mbugua, 2002). During 
this period views contrary to those of the political leadership under Moi were 
repressed, especially in the mid- 1980s with the MwaKenya crackdown which 
undermined the judiciary system and was characterised by torture.  Mbugua 
(2002) explains that power was concentrated in the office of the Presidency. 
 
Barkan (2004) explains that Moi tightened his grip on power moving towards 
repressive governance after the 1982 failed coup attempt. This was also a 
period of economic decline, which lasted until 2002, when multiparty 
democracy was introduced, ending the long-term reign of the KANU 
government.  It was only when the opposition united under President Mwai 
Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 that the opposition was 
able to topple KANU which was then campaigning under the leadership of 
Uhuru Kenyatta (Barkan, 2004). 
 
Kenya went into violence after the contested December 27th 2007 election 
results. Pre- election results showed that opposition leader Raila Odinga was 
on the lead with 57% and President Mwai Kibaki trailing behind with 39%. 
Election results, however, announced that Kibaki has won by 46%, while Raila 
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had 44%. The results sparked violence and conflict among the Kikuyu and 
Luo tribal groups, Mr Kibaki belongs to the kikuyu tribe while Mr Odinga 
belongs to the Luo. The violence intensified in January 2008 when 50 
Kikuyu’s were killed seeking refuge in a church by what was believed to be a 
Luo mob.10 
In the run up to the 2007 elections, the opposition failed to form a united 
coalition. Although the ODM started with bigwigs like Uhuru Kenyatta, 
Kalonzo Musyoka and Raila Odinga, it could not ‘hold together’ for long. 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Chairman of KANU first announced that KANU would elect 
its own parliamentary and civic candidates outside of ODM. He announced 
that the party would support a democratically elected ODM representative; 
provided party followers were allowed to decide on their leader.  Although 
internal Presidential competition was evident from the beginning, some like 
Mudavadi insisted that what seemed like infighting in the ODM was only a 
symbol for democracy.11 The ODM finally nominated Raila Odinga as their 
Presidential candidate while Kalonzo Musyoka decided broke away from the 
ODM and contested the presidential polls from an ODM- Kenya ticket.12 
The pro- Kibaki re- election parties formed a coalition named on the 23rd 
August 2007 as the Party of National Unity (PNU). Parties which formed the 
unity include Narc- Kenya, Ford- Kenya, Ford- People, Democratic Party of 
Kenya, Safina, Sisi Kwasisi, Shirikisho, Spark, Agang Mazingira and other 
small parties.13 Those who supported Kibaki’s re- election bid were mostly 
motivated by his development record.14 KANU under Uhuru Kenyatta left the 
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 News 24. “Kenyan fireband to face Kibaki” http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-
1447_2175787,00.html- Accessed 03/08/2007. 
13
  Muchemi Wachira and Lucas Barasa. “Now pro- Kibaki party registered” Daily Nation. 
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ODM coalition to join other Kibaki friendly parties in the PNU.15 KANU’s move 
was indeed a historical one because it was a case in which a major opposition 
party decided to join the ruling party in the run- up to national elections. 
Fierce competition involved each party promising the electorate what changes 
they would bring to build a better Kenya. President Kibaki launched what he 
called the ‘contract with Kenyans’ as part of the PNU campaign. He pledged 
to improve prosperity, security and equity in the next 5 years by making sure 
that every Kenyan had access to basic education, decent shelter, enough 
food and a decent job with decent pay. Kibaki said he would ensure 6.3% 
economic growth, double investment and infrastructure. Other plans included 
improving job opportunities for women and eradicating corruption.16 Kibaki 
had reached out to the youths in his campaigns which focused more on 
development, national unity and building a better economy. President Kibaki 
promised to promote regional federation in the East African Community which 
would ensure free movement of persons, goods and services.17 
Opposition leader Raila Odinga on the other hand promised to transform the 
Jua Kali sector for job creation by integrating it into the mainstream economy. 
Mr Odinga said that his party would promote Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) for sustainable job creation and provision of goods and services for 
the local market. The party also promised to increase the participation of 
women and youth in decision- making and government. Mr Odinga also 
promised the provision of free primary and secondary education as well as 
increasing investment in infrastructure.18 
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The election campaigns were characterised by what the media said was 
‘pockets of violence’ in some areas ahead of the December 2007 elections. 
President Kibaki condemned acts of violence during the election period.19 
Violent protests also followed when there was a complaint around the 
nominations of Parliamentary candidates in the ODM, ODM- K and PNU, 
especially in Kisimu and Mombasa.20 
During the campaign period, ODM candidate Mr Raila Odinga said that he 
would accept election results if he was beaten fairly.21 As already mentioned 
above, Kenya plunged into conflict22 soon after the announcement of Kibaki’s 
victory. It is clear then that Mr Odinga did not think that he was beaten fairly.  
Mediators were trying to help the two opposing parties find a lasting solution 
that would end the violence. Mr Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the 
United Nations and others (such as Graca Machel and Benjamin Mkapa) is 
currently mediating for peace and order. Before Mr Annan arrived, talks were 
headed by Ghanaian President John Kufour, in his capacity as the 
chairperson of the African Union.23 Progress was made as Mr Annan 
persuaded Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga to meet face- to- face.24 Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni also flew into Kenya to mediate between the 
contenders. His arrival sparked concern by the Forum for Concerned Kenyans 
and Friends in South Africa who pleaded with President Museveni in an open 
                                               
19
 Daily Nation. Politics. 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=2&newsid=110694- 
Accessed 16/11/2007. 
20The Nation Team. “ ECK vows to act as more losers protest” 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=111028- 
Accessed 21/11/2007. 
21
 Mugo Njeru and George Munene. “I will accept defeat if beaten fairly, says Raila” 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=105429- 
Accessed 29/08/2007. 
22
  News24. Africa News. “Kenya ethnic clashes continue” 
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2259741,00.html- Accessed 28/01/2008. 
23
 Berbard Namunane.  “Anan urges leaders to ‘make hard choices’” 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=115498- 
Accessed 28/01/2008. 
24
 Voice of Africa Radio. “Ex- UN chief gets Kenyan rivals to meet” 
http://voiceofafricaradio.com/Newsreel/news_read.php?nid=186- Accessed 28/01/2008.  
 48 
letter that he retracts his pre-mature recognition of Mr Kibaki’s Presidency and 
that he withdraws from mediation since is not impartial.25  
The ANC’s newly elected President Jacob Zuma condemned what was 
happening in Kenya as “absolutely not right”. Zuma saw his own ascendance 
to ANC Presidency after the Polokwane Conference in South Africa as a sign 
of how democracy was deep rooted in an African country.26  While South 
Africa’s Desmond Tutu was met with lukewarm response in his efforts to 
intervene; the Kibaki government refused intervention by Cyril Ramaphosa 
saying that they “did not trust South African’ intervention”.27 This was 
disappointing for a country that hopes to play a meaningful role in mediation 
efforts in Africa. Desmond Tutu’s visit was perhaps too early in the conflict to 
expect any positive progress. Ramaphosa was not only a high- level ANC 
member but also as a prominent businessman, he might have been 
suspected to have vested interest. 
 The open letter written by a group of Kenyan academics residing in South 
Africa (the Forum for Concerned Kenyans and Friends in South Africa) 
pleaded President Museveni not to mediate in Kenya. This group believed 
that President Kibaki had ‘stolen’ the election. One would assume that the 
government might have suspected that this group might inform the South 
African mediator about what they think is happening in Kenya, a judgement 
the government would not trust. It seems that there is more into Kenya’s 
‘mistrust’ of a South African mediator than just dislike for the South African/s. 
 
According to the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), 
Kenyan elections were important for the international community because of 
the country’s stability (prior to the December 2007 elections) inside a troubled 
(Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia) region, its role in mediation, its relatively 
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advanced finance and trade sector in the East African region, and the 
production of high quality products especially in coffee, tea and flowers.28 
One may note that Kenya’s role in the region with regard to the promotion of 
peace and democratic governance was almost threatened by domestic 
tensions. The violence damaged Kenya’s economy, which was relatively 
strong compared to others in the region. The government, led by Mwai Kibaki 
and the opposition, led by Raila Odinga reached a power sharing deal early 
(February) in 2008 when the opposition leader settled for the powerful Prime 
Minister post. The Cabinet positions were divided between government and 
opposition.29 The power-sharing agreement if honoured by both parties, in 
practice can help Kenya recover from its political and economic crisis and find 
its way as a major player in the region and indeed the continent. 
Economic position 
Mwega and Ndung’u (2002) ‘periodised’ Kenya’s economic performance from 
1960 to 1997. The first decade of independence (1960- 1974) showed 
improved economic performance (from 0.38% to 3. 67% to 4.85%). The 
period from 1975 to 1984 (from 1.62% to -0.76% to 1.99%) was characterised 
by declining/ poor economic performance. The decline during this period was 
accredited to oil shocks in the global economy and bad domestic policies, with 
balance of payment problems. From 1985 to 1989 (1.99%), there was some 
recovery in the country’s economic performance which was associated with 
the 1986 coffee boom, good weather, and decrease in oil prices. There was 
another decline in performance in the period between 1990 and 1997 (-1.83). 
Structural adjustment reforms which were applied to every sector of the 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s did not improve performance. The decline 
was worsened by the coup attempt of 1982 and the drought which followed in 
the two years after. The economy continued to perform badly under bad 
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weather, increased oil prices and political instability with ethnic clashes 
(Mwega and Ndung’u, 2002). 
Kenya’s real GDP has been steadily grew since 2002(-1.2%), with 0.8% in 
2003, 6.0% in 2004, 7.0% in 2005, 5.8% in 2006 and it increased to 7.1% in 
the second quarter of 2007. The key sectors contributing to growth were 
manufacturing, hospitality (hotels and restaurants) and services (transport and 
telecommunications). Inflation also declined from 13.0 in the second quarter 
of 2006 to 7.7% in the first quarter of 2007 (Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2007).30 Kenya is a dominant economy in the East African region, 
with a growing IT infrastructure.31 
The evidence of Export Led Growth in East Asia influenced Kenya to adopt 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a strategy towards 
industrialisation (Were, Ndung’u, Geda and Karingi 2002). During the 1980s, 
most of Kenya’s exports were absorbed by regional partners in EAC and 
COMESA. Trade was expanded by membership to regional blocks such as 
EAC, COMESA, CBI and IGAD (Ng’ eno et al., 2003).  Exports to COMESA, 
for instance, increased from 15% in the period from 1990- 1992 to 34% in the 
period 1996- 1998. Besides tourism, Kenya’s export structure is dominated by 
agricultural commodities, mainly, tea, coffee and horticulture; the export 
sector is thus very vulnerable to global prices. Kenya’s major trading partners 
and export destinations are the European Union (in coffee, horticulture and 
tea), Asian countries (in tea and coffee) and COMESA for processed goods 
(Nyangito, 2003). 
Agriculture contributes 19.3% of Kenya’s GDP, employing over 75% of the 
population (excluding the informal sector). Agro- industries make- up 70% of 
all industrial production and more than 50% of export revenue comes from the 
primary commodities such as ‘tea, coffee, sisal, pyrethrum, sugar cane, wheat 
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and cotton’ (Sebei, 2006: 7).  According to Sebei, Kenya is able to produce 
more than 70% of its demand for wheat. Tea is the most important cash crop 
and its dominance in the market has been attributed to the improved skills of 
small scale farmers. Sebei explains that other than India and China, Kenya 
now produces more tea for the world market. Coffee, sisal (Kenya is ranked 
as the second world producer), and cut flowers (fourth) are also an important 
cash crops. Kenya’s imports also include ‘cashew nuts, fruits and vegetables, 
beef and dairy’ (Sebei, 2006: 8). 
According to a World Bank Group report, Kenya (on eighth place) is ranked as 
one of the top 10 business regulatory reformers. This means that the country 
was rated as one that is better able to attract foreign investment.32 Kenya is 
reported to have launched a determined licence reform programme, 
eliminating 110 business licences and simplifying 8 more. These changes 
have cut both business time and costs of start- up. The programme promises 
to eliminate or simplify about 900 of the 1, 300 licences. Property registration 
has speeded- up and the Private credit bureau is more efficient, making it able 
to collect a wider range of data.33 The World Bank Group study revealed that 
Kenya provides the best trade logistics in the region and is among the best in 
the continent, with South Africa ranked the best in Africa. Countries with low 
logistics costs are better able to take advantage of trade in an increasingly 
globalizing world.34 
 
At a time when the country was preparing for the December 2007 polls, 
domestic investment in Kenya was promising.35 The Kenyan government in its 
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determination to present Kenya as a preferred investment destination 
identified 424 licences for elimination and 604 for simplification. The 
procedures that businesses had to go through to meet tax filings obligations 
were also reduced. The move was a joint operation by the Ministry of Finance 
and the World Bank and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service. Since the 
reform started in 2005, it takes 31 days less ‘to start a business’ with the 
implementation of the Government’s Rapid Results Initiative. The approval 
process which could take 80 days or more is still one of the areas which are 
behind in the reform process. The use of electronic instead of manual filing is 
seen (especially by business) as a move in the right direction, since it saves 
time.36 
Participation in the multilateral regime: 
Kenya became a signatory member of the WTO in 1995 and some of its 
objectives are the promotion of a more open trade regime, the expansion 
access to overseas markets, and further integration into the global economy 
(Nyangito, 2003). According to a World Trade Organisation report (Odiambo, 
Kamau and McComick, 2008) Kenya gained a valuable experience 
particularly in the agricultural trade negotiations.  Kenya has also been active 
in trade in services and intellectual rights related issues.37 
Stahl (2005) explains that EAC members (Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) 
finalised a Customs Union protocol in January 2005. The Customs Union 
protocol of 1 January 2005, provided for Kenya to eliminate its tariffs on 
imports from Tanzania and Uganda while imports from Kenya would have to 
be phased out steadily over a period of five years. Kenya   is a member of the 
COMESA Free Trade Area which allows it to enjoy free trade preferences with 
10 other member countries. Kenya imports (a mere 3.2% of its world import) 
less from the region, compared to Uganda (26.8%, with 97% of it from Kenya) 
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and Tanzania (5.3%, 95% of which is from Kenya). It is clear that Kenya’s 
neighbours are dependant on Kenyan imports. 
Rwanda and Burundi have since the 18th of June 2007 been accepted into the 
East African Community. Their membership was agreed at a summit attended 
by Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Mwai Kibaki (Kenya), Jakaya Kikwete 
(Tanzania), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and Pierre Nkurunziza (Burundi). 
According to media reports, the new membership is beneficial for Kenya 
because it has better infrastructure and a stronger economy in the region. 
Kenya mainly exports to the region, which gives it a more expanded market.  
Mr. Tom Ojenda, President of the East Africa Law Society said the countries 
needed to adopt a trade protocol for the free movement of goods and services 
for the region’ expanded trade regime. The expectation is that the region 
would have a common market by 2010.38 The common market would allow for 
the free flow of goods and services as well as the free movement of persons. 
So far Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians can travel without visas using an 
EAC passport.39 
According to a study by the Steadman Group Survey (conducted in capital 
cities), Kenyans were more eager about EAC and the inclusion of the new 
members. In Kenya, there was an awareness of EAC of about 91%, while 
Tanzania and Uganda followed by 89%. The popularity poll demonstrated that 
46% Tanzanians, 10% Kenyans and 16% Ugandans were not in favour of the 
regional block. Analysts pointed to Kenya’s relative economic position as a 
motivation for the eagerness to the regional formation.40  Speaking at the 
African Union summit in Accra (2007), Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki said 
that though a political and economic union of Africa can be achieved in a short 
time, there must be a clear direction of the integration process. Furthermore 
citizens and other non-state actors should also be considered if a ‘United 
                                               
38
 Lucas Barasa. Daily Nation. News Extra. “ EAC goodwill high as approval widens” 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=39&newsid=101150-
Accessed 27/06/2007 
39
 Kaburu Mugambi. Daily Nation. Business. “Team seeks views on EA Common market”. 
http://ww.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?premiumid=0&category_id=3&newsid=
101143- Accessed 27/06/2007. 
40
 Mwaura Kimani. “Kenyans more keen on EAC than neighbours” 
http://www.bdafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1849&Itemid=5813-
Accessed 10/07/2007. 
 54 
States of Africa’ is to be realised. Kibaki said that regional economic blocks 
were important for integration, pointing to the widened EAC which is already 
making regional economic strides and aims to achieve political federation by 
2013. The advocates of a common Africa argue that such a state would have 
more bargaining power in international negotiations and would be more 
capacitated to deal with conflict and insecurity problems in the continent. 
Expectations are that there would be free movements of goods, services and 
people and the continent would be able to jointly achieve accelerated growth 
and development.41 Whether the citizens of the continent are ready for such a 
union or not remains an issue of debate. 
Regional co operation in EAC covers ‘trade, investment, industrial 
development, monetary and fiscal affairs, infrastructure and human resources, 
science and technology, agriculture and food security, environment and 
natural resource, management, tourism and wildlife management, health, 
social and cultural activities’ (Sebei, 2006: 5). The community also cooperates 
in the free movement of production factors, political issues, defence, security, 
foreign affairs and legal and judicial matters.  
Kenya is a member of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) of the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which has a 
population of 400 million.42 Members of the PTA enjoy preferential tariff rates 
and aim to eventually establish a common trade area.  Under the Cotonou 
Agreement, Kenya has trade and aid agreements with 77 other countries in 
Africa, Caribbean Pacific countries and the European Union (Sebei, 2006). 
Nyangito(2003) argues that Kenya would benefit more if there were strong 
rules that protect the country against powerful nations and if rules would help 
improve domestic trade and policies. Trade and agriculture reform in 
particular is important to Kenya because this sector dominates the economy, 
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employing 75% of the work force and contributing 25% to total GDP. 
Agriculture as mentioned before is Kenya’s major foreign exchange earner. 
Nyangito (2003) explains that like other developing countries, Kenya faces 
barriers such as the Technical Barriers, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards which are required by the developed world but hard to implement 
often because of lack of the technical capacity to do so. Major exports 
produce such as coffee and tea however; do not have problems accessing 
European markets. 
Since 1997, EAC has been Kenya’s main export destination. Trade with 
COMESA has also been increasing. The benefits of regional integration have 
been evident in increased trade with Africa. Kenya’s imports are dominated by 
industrial goods (34.5%), machinery and capital (32.4%) and fuel and 
lubricants (15.5%) (Ng’ eno et al., 2003). 
Kenya offers preferential tariff treatment subject to rules of origin to COMESA 
members and also enjoys preferential tariff treatment by other EAC members 
(notably Tanzania and Uganda) from 2004. All imports to Kenya pay a 
declaration fee (2.75%) and a further 1% is collected from agricultural imports 
on the Cost Insurance and Freight (Sebei, 2006).    
Kenya being a signatory of the United Nations and African Union conventions 
offers refugee asylum to persons fleeing conflict in neighbouring countries. 
Crisp (2000) explains that the majority of refugees in Kenya were located in 
the North- West (Kakuma) and North- East (Dadaab) regions, and that they 
were mostly from Sudan and Somalia respectively. Refugees suffer violence 
in the form of beatings, rape, assault, and armed robberies often executed by 
bandit groups. The activities of the bandit groups challenge security in the 
refugee camps and sometimes in the surrounding areas. According to Crisp 
(2000), most of the violent crimes are committed by other members of the 
refugee community. Crisp argues that the Kenyan government since 
independence has been preoccupied with state security with the perception 
that refugee presence threatens state security. 
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Kenya’s need to prove its commitment to human rights and democracy in 
order to attract foreign aid obligates it to receive refugees. The flow of small 
arms from neighbouring countries (especially Somalia, South Sudan and 
Northern Uganda) creates a form of insecurity for the Kenyan government. 
Somali refugees are often criminalised because of suspected links to terrorist 
groups but it also makes the protection of asylum seekers difficult. Kenya for 
instance was reported by the media to have prevented 7000 Somali refugees 
from entering its borders in 2007. 43 
The events of September 11th 2001 when the United States of America was 
attacked by suicide bombers changed the international political climate where 
non- state actors were able to invade nation states. The United States of 
America (U.S.) identified Kenya together with other countries (Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan) in the Horn as sources of terrorism.44  
Kenya experienced acts of terror first in 1980 when a bomb was planted in 
Nairobi at the Norfolk Hotel (related to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict), then 
the truck bomb attack at the U.S. embassy and a car bomb attack at the 
Kikambala paradise Hotel in 2002 and 1998 respectively (both allegedly 
connected to the Al Qaeda group). 
In response to these attacks, the Kenyan government has cooperated with the 
U.S. Government in the fight against terror.  Ten months after he was sworn 
into Presidency, Mwai Kibaki visited the U.S. and expressed Kenya’s 
willingness to cooperate in the war against terror (Barkan, 2004).  Barkan 
explains that beyond West leanings, Kenya’s position must be understood as 
wanting to protect itself from terrorist attacks targeting Americans in Kenya. 
Kenya thus plays an important role in the stability of the region, serving as a 
platform for United States operations. To supplement these relations, Kenya 
has the largest U.S. embassy in Africa. Specific areas of cooperation include 
the use of the Mombasa port and Kenya’s international airports by the US 
navy agreed in 1981. This facilitates the US in its naval operations, food aid 
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missions to Somalia, Rwanda and South Sudan (Barkan, 2004). This shows 
that despite concerns by the local Islamic community, Kenya occupies a geo- 
strategic position in international politics as an ‘ally’ for the US in the war 
against terrorism.45 Kenya’s leanings towards the West can be contrasted with 
South Africa’s rhetoric on Africa’s turn to solve its own problems expressed in 
the African Renaissance vision. The complexities of conflicts in the horn as 
well as the challenge on states by non-states actors however; drive states 
towards cooperation to deal with common problems in an increasingly 
globalising world. 
Buzan and Waever (2003) argued that regional security in the Horn is weakly 
structured and blurry. The countries involved in the regional complex are: 
Uganda, Sudan, Central Africa, DRC, Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania and 
their insecurities are often affected by outside intervention and support. Buzan 
and Waever further view regional security as the interdependence of a group 
of states or other actors. African states are ‘weak’ and intervention by 
neighbours is widespread with kinship and religious alliances making it easy 
for conflicts to spill over to neighbours.  The East African countries have 
relatively similar cultures and history (Ajulu, 2005). The conflicts between 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in the 1990s for instance drew Uganda and 
Kenya into the politics of the region. This was because kinship and religious 
ties transcended national boundaries making it hard to distinguish between 
national and regional factors (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2001). 
The Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 
1996. It took over from the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD) which was formed in 1986 to deal with natural 
disasters.  IGAD’s expanded regional cooperation includes areas in 
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‘agriculture and environment, economic cooperation and social development, 
peace and security and gender affairs.46 
According to Buzan and Waewver (2003) IGAD connects Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda can be viewed as a security 
forum and not a developed regional security complex. 
Although East Africa and the Horn are often considered as weak regional 
communities, Kenya plays a significant role, especially through IGAD in 
promoting negotiations between the warring parties within different countries. 
The Juba talks between the LRA and Ugandan government in Kenya for 
instance continue amid allegations of ‘poor organisation.’47  South Africa, 
Kenya and Mozambique have been invited by the UN envoy, Joaquim 
Chissano, to observe the Ugandan peace talks which are ongoing.48   
IGAD has been playing an important role in the area of peace and security in 
East Africa and the Horn. The thesis shall return to its activities in the next 
Chapter using a case study on Kenya’s role in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in South Sudan. Kenya is a 
strategically important country in the East African region. Economically it 
serves as a gateway for trade with the rest of the region. Politically it helps in 
the promotion of democratic peace and stability. Given South Africa’s foreign 
policy priorities, one may wonder why there hasn’t been active collaboration 
between South Africa and Kenya. The next Chapter focuses on the political 
and economic dynamics of South Africa- Kenya relations. 
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Chapter 4: Political and economic dynamics of South Africa- Kenya 
relations. 
This chapter shall begin by explaining the current nature of political relations 
between South Africa and Kenya. The reception or resentment of South 
African businesses in Kenya shall also be explored in this chapter. The 
chapter would investigate whether there are economic tensions which could 
be hindering robust relations between the two countries. It shall then consider 
how the two countries have conducted themselves and related to each other, 
specifically on mediation in South Sudan.  
Bilateral political and economic relations 
The history of Kenya and the ANC (which became the ruling party in South 
Africa in 1994), was shaky and it formed the background of current relations. 
According to a researcher, in the early years of his Presidency, Mandela 
‘avoided’ Kenya; a position which was then thought as due to Moi’s dictatorial 
leadership. Personalities thus affect foreign policy relations, an aspect which 
is not adequately explained by international relations theories explained 
earlier in this thesis. Post 2002, there was change of leadership on both sides, 
which, for some helped improve relations.49 According to a Kenyan reporter, 
the history of KANU’s liberal/ West- leaning policies prevented it from showing 
leadership in actively helping the South African liberation parties.50 As 
indicated earlier, Kenya welcomed De Klerk at a time when Mandela was 
lobbying for the non- recognition of the apartheid state.  According to a South 
African official, South Africans had difficulties accessing KANU Ministers, until 
2002, which negatively affected foreign policy relations at the time. The official 
also noted that relationships were lukewarm until 2002; with obvious 
economic tensions in the late 1990s.51 
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Reflecting on South Africa- Kenya relations, one researcher commented that 
though relationships started on a shaky path in 1994, South Africa (being the 
largest African economy) seems to be looking for new partnerships. Kenya is 
one such identified partner and relationships were said to be growing. 
Politically, post 1994 South Africa came with an admirable/ good constitution 
which was a model for Kenya’s own constitutional draft. The change of power 
from KANU to NARC contributed to the democratisation process (Interview 
with Researcher). The researcher noted that Kenya could still learn from 
South Africa’s democracy.52 
High level visits are often an indication of the nature of relations that countries 
enjoy with each other. Although the Ministries of foreign Affairs in both 
countries have described relations as cordial53, there do not seem to be 
satisfactory visits by particularly, the head of states. Although Kenyan 
President Mwai Kibaki visited South Africa in 2003, the South African 
President at the time (Thabo Mbeki) never returned the favour. One Kenyan 
journalist said “people (in Kenya) perceive South Africa to only behave 
‘African’ when they are looking for something for themselves” (Interview with 
journalist). For some, the ‘Big- brother’ attitude does not go unnoticed, 
especially considering that then President Thabo Mbeki never visited Kenya, 
despite its strategic importance in the East Africa and Horn of Africa 
region(s)54 
Some South African officials have however argued that President Mwai 
Kibaki’s visit to South Africa has in itself improved relations between the two 
countries, which in principle speak volumes in foreign policy relations. High 
level visits are a mode of communication and encourage dialogue which is an 
important political/ diplomatic tool.55 It was noted that official visits are 
themselves a diplomatic breakthrough. The South African officials have noted 
that relations have improved and indeed moved beyond official visits since 
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President Kibaki’s visit t South Africa.56 South Africa’s then Deputy President, 
Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka visited Kenya in July 2007 before the signing of the 
Joint Commission of Co operation.57 
 
In fact the Foreign Ministers’ continual engagement on different platforms may 
suggest that relations are indeed cordial.  In his August 2003 official visit to 
South Africa, Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs and his 
South African counterpart, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen bilateral relations. 
According to media reports, the agreements broadly outlined a framework for 
cooperation in “economic, political, technical, scientific, security and cultural 
fields based on the principles of equality and reciprocal advantages”.58 It 
should be noted that while the MOU is too broad, it certainly allows for an 
enabling environment for deeper engagement in the future. 
After the signing of the agreement, President Thabo Mbeki said he valued the 
role that Kenya was playing in the affairs of the continent and the East African 
region in particular. Mbeki hoped that economic relations would be 
strengthened and that more needed to be done to address the trade 
disparities.59 The issue of trade imbalance is a sensitive area whose impact 
on general South Africa- Kenya relations cannot be ignored. A Reuters report 
commented that mistrust between the two countries has previously harmed 
relations. Kenya was said to be ‘anxious’ about the trade imbalance, wanting 
to change it and had also previously accused South Africa for flooding its 
markets with surplus goods while blocking Kenyan goods from entering its 
markets by imposing tariffs and other barriers.60African countries in general, 
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and Kenya and South Africa in particular need to abandon uncompetitive 
behaviour so as to promote intra- Africa trade. 
Despite complaints about tariff barriers for their products entering South Africa 
and the trade imbalance, Kenya is South Africa’s 6th most important trading 
partner outside of SADC.61  Kenya and South Africa entered into an 
agreement to improve trade and investment relations. This followed President 
Mwai Kibaki’s visits to South Africa. Prior to the visit, there were concerns of 
South Africa’s use of non-tariff barriers against Kenyan goods investigated by 
a joint Commission for Cooperation. The key sectors included in the 
agreement were: ‘investment, sports, culture, security and processing of travel 
visas’. Onyango(2007) has argued that post apartheid South Africa has 
become one of Kenya’s top sources of Foreign Direct Investment.62 
On the Kenyan side however, the revised 1968 Trade Licensing Act requires 
that all domestic and international traders in Kenya register with the Attorney 
General Chambers in order to operate. Sebei (2006) explains that although 
trade is open to all, foreigners are not allowed to conduct business in certain 
areas or trade in certain goods and licensing fees varies with the type of 
business and or where it operates.  Imports to Kenya are subjected to ‘quality 
and quantity inspection and price comparison’ (Sebei, 2006: 9). Kenya’s 
border charges contribute up to 54% of total tax revenue. Sebei shows that 
the manufacturing sector with an average tariff of 18.2% is the most 
protected, followed by the agricultural sector and mining and quarrying with 
averages of 16.7% and 13.5% respectively. Sebei argues that the agricultural 
sector is the most protected sector when one considers the mean tariff rate of 
21.3%, using the Uruguay definition. Sebei (2006) says that there are barriers 
to market access for South African goods in Kenya. The most affected 
products include vegetables, cereals, milling products, fats and oils, sugars, 
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miscellaneous preparations, and beverages, which have an average tariff of 
almost 25% . 
 
South Africa has an advantage in its trade with the rest of the continent given 
its relatively developed economy. Only about 7.8% of South Africa’s imports 
are from the rest of Africa. SADC and COMESA however supply 80% of 
South Africa’s African agricultural imports (Daya and Rantao, 2006). It is 
argued that the application of high tariffs for agricultural products by each 
region, tariff and other non- tariff barriers impede greater intra- Africa trade. 
Other barriers to trade in Africa include ‘poor infrastructure, including 
transport, political instability, import and export restrictions, customs 
formalities and export procedures, technical regulations and standards’ (Daya 
and Rantao, 2006). 
South Africa’s imports and Exports to Kenya 
Annual Imports Exports 
2004 
R328 464 
000 R2961 124 000 
2005 
R203 565 
000 R2976 695 000 
2006 
(August) 
R120 012 
000 R2 0732 219 000 
Source: DFA63. 
The trade imbalance trend is not unique to Kenya as far as South Africa and 
other African countries’ trade is concerned. In 2002, South Africa exported 
16% of its total exports to Africa but imported only 4% from the rest of the 
continent in the same year.64 In 2004 Kenya was the fourth largest export 
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destination for South African agricultural products in Africa accounting for 
R416 million worth of revenue. Exports to Kenya that year made up 2% of 
South Africa’s total exports in agricultural products; whilst imports accounted 
for only 0.2% in total. The problem of trade imbalance lies with the fact that 
Kenya is primarily an agricultural economy while South Africa is advanced in 
manufacturing, service and technology, which makes it able to produce high 
value at low costs.65  Sebei (2006) explains that the wide disparity and trade 
advantage that South Africa enjoys in relation to Kenya was given by South 
Africa’s more diversified production as well as the production technical ‘know- 
how’ which gives South African farmers a competitive advantage. 
The total value of South African agricultural exports to Kenya was estimated 
to R414.5 million (1.83% of total Kenyan agricultural imports) in 2004. Leading 
export products are ‘cereal, sugars, miscellaneous edible preparations and 
beverages’ (p. 15). Cereals (major ones being maize corn, rice, oats, wheat 
and meslin) alone account for 51% of South Africa’s agricultural exports to 
Kenya (p20). 
Although South Africa is the world 8th maize exporter, in Kenya it is the 
leading supplier (supplying 57% of maize corn in 2004). The major competitor 
is the USA (8% in 2004) which is the second maize corn supplier in Kenya. In 
2004, Kenya was the leading importer (46%) of refined sugar from South 
Africa. Miscellaneous edible preparations (food preparations, extract of coffee, 
soup, broths, ice cream, yeasts and baking powder) accounted for 6% total 
exports to Kenya in 2004 (Sebei, 2006). 
The importance of focusing on agriculture when analysing African economies 
is mainly because given the levels of development in most African countries, 
agriculture contributes 60% of employment in Africa as a region and 20% of 
total GDP for Africa as a region (Sebei, 2006). Sebei argues that South 
Africa’s dominant economic position in the continent gives it a lot of 
responsibility with regard to driving African development, trade and 
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investment which he thinks the country is already committed to through the 
NEPAD initiative. 
Major imports from Kenya to South Africa in 2004, were ‘sugar and sugar 
confectionary, coffee, tea, mate and spices, edible vegetables, and certain 
roots and tubers’ (Sebei, 2006:19).  Sugar alone accounted for 32% of total 
agricultural imports from Kenya and 4% of total South African import of the 
same product in 2004. South Africa was the 8th largest importer of the same 
product from Kenya. Coffee, tea, mate and spices imports to South Africa 
were estimated to be R8 million in 2004, with imports dominated by tea. In the 
three year period (2002- 2004), Kenyan tea export grew by 242% and South 
African import of Kenyan tea also grew by 19%. Kenya is a leading exporter of 
this product and supplies 29% of it to the world market. Malawi (55%) is the 
biggest exporter of tea to South Africa. Malawi and Zimbabwe (second largest 
importer) enjoy ‘preferential tariff treatment under SADC agreement’ (p. 22). 
Trade Map estimates were conducted to identify trade opportunities between 
SACU and Kenya in agricultural products which show the most potential. 
‘Sugar and sugar confectionary, miscellaneous edible preparations, 
beverages, and cereals had the greatest export potential. In food preparation, 
South Africa enjoyed 47% market share of total Kenyan import demand. In 
2003, South Africa was the leading exporter to Kenya in sources, 
preparations, mixed condiments, and seasonings, enjoying a market share of 
approximately 47%. In maize corn, South Africa’s (35%) Kenyan market share 
came only second to that of the USA (59%) (Sebei, 2006). 
According to Sebei (2006), Kenya’s raw tobacco (partly or wholly stemmed 
and not stemmed/ stripped), export to SACU was 49%, which is 5% of Kenya 
world export for this product. The major exporter of the product to South Africa 
is Zimbabwe (38% share). South Africa imported 5% of not stemmed un- 
manufactured tobacco from Kenya. Leading suppliers of the same product to 
South Africa are China (29%) and India (12%) while major markets for Kenya 
are Egypt (44%) and Colombia (18%). The biggest export destination for 
Kenya’s sugar and confectionary without cocoa is Tanzania (42% total 
export), South Africa consumed only 2% in 2003. Major suppliers to South 
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Africa are Brazil (47%) and Colombia (16%). South Africa’s total imports in 
raw hides and animal skin constituted 7% of Kenya’s total exports. Major 
exports of this product to the South African market are Australia (30%) and 
the UK (12%). Sebei argues that there is potential for trade in raw bovine skin, 
currently South Africa imports most of this product from Australia (74%) and 
Brazil (32%), while Kenya mostly exports to Hong Kong (71%). Other 
products with potential for trade growth are edible vegetables. Imports from 
Kenya rose by 48% in 2004 compared to the previous year. The largest 
importer of these products was Zimbabwe (52% market share).  Kenya’s 
biggest exports destinations were the UK (74%), and the Netherlands. China 
supplied over 90% of leguminous vegetables to South Africa. In 2004, Kenya 
had a 4% share of the South African market in beans; the South African 
market was dominated by the China (44%) and USA (39%) (Sebei, 2006). 
Sebei (2006) concluded that the bias in trade relations between South Africa 
and Kenya is obvious because South Africa exports almost 15 times more 
than it imports from Kenya. As noted before, the imbalance has been a 
concern for Kenyan officials. To overcome this disparity, Sebei suggests that 
both countries need to trade in those products in which they have a 
comparative (and not only competitive) advantage. 
South Africa’s advantage is in ‘cereals, sugars, miscellaneous edible 
preparations and beverages while Kenya’s is in tobacco, sugar, raw hides and 
vegetables’ (p. 29). As an African country, South Africa has a strategic 
advantage over most of its agricultural competitors (UK, USA and the 
Netherlands) in Kenya. Sebei recommended that there needs to be a focus on 
reducing trade barriers and improving infrastructure between the two 
countries. This would ensure that African countries are able to intensify trade 
with each other and not overly depend on imports from the North. 
Nieuwoudt (2007) observed that although there are South African goods 
(such as cereal, instant coffee, soup, toiletries) in Kenyan retail stores, 
consumers wanting to purchase these have to pay three times more than they 
would have to pay for in South Africa. This view is contrary to the belief that 
South Africa is able to flood other African and indeed Kenyan markets with its 
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cheap products. This could mean that although South Africa is able to export 
surplus production, this does not necessarily mean that those products were 
the cheapest in the Kenyan markers. 
 In March 2007, trade indexes showed that South Africa exported goods worth 
57.6 million US dollars and imported only 1.86 million US dollars from Kenya. 
In a visit to Nairobi in 2006, Dlamini Zuma said trade imbalances can only be 
resolved in the long term. Commenting on the bilateral commission which was 
first discussed in 2003, when Kenyan President Kibaki visited South Africa, 
Stewart Henderson (from the South African Business Association of Kenya) 
said it would ease up red tape and opens the opportunity for exchanging 
human capacity.  
In fact a delegation from the Limpopo Province’s Department of Agriculture 
went to Kenya to learn about tea production. The aim was to improve 
production in the Tshivhase, Mukumbani, Grenshoek and Middelkop tea 
estates.  This was part of concretising the MOU signed between South Africa 
and Kenya. The decision was made in 2005 to revitalise the tea estate in a 
sustainable manner after periods of disinvestment.  According to an official, 
the South African tea industry was facing a lot of competition because of low 
protection (compared to the past), strong rand, high production cost structure, 
high worker minimum wages and the high expectation of returns by the Tea 
Board.  While Kenya produces about 178 million kilos of tea per year, South 
Africa only produces 11million kilos annually, 5 million of which were from the 
Limpopo Province. For the official, it is clear that South Africa is too small to 
be a strong competitor for Kenya in that area. Although South Africa 
consumes 22 million kilos of tea, only 11 million of these were locally 
produced as already mentioned. South Africa lacks skills as far as value chain 
is concerned. The exchange programme with Kenya involved training 
(academic and operational), research, business and entrepreneual. The core 
of relations with Kenya in this area is about skills transfer for effective 
 68 
production. During the time of writing (2007) there were Kenyan farmers in the 
Mukumbani estate assisting in the tea production.66 
 
“While inviting foreign investments, Kenya also needs to hold out its own 
against aggressive moves by dominant financial markets like South Africa. A 
trade invasion by South Africa into the Kenyan market has seen a flood of 
South African manufactured goods into the country. This has had a bad effect 
on the local manufacturing sector, which is still trying hard to make a place for 
itself in the international market” - (Business guide, 2008).67 
The quote above expresses concerns, mainly by the Kenyan business 
community that South African companies are monopolising the market and 
getting an unfair advantage. The report from Business Guide said South 
Africa is yet to eradicate some trade barriers which were adopted during the 
apartheid era because the protectionist policies have an impact on its trade 
with Kenya and indeed other countries. South Africa- Kenya trade was 
contrasted with that between Kenya and the United Arab Emirates. The latter 
enjoys a ‘robust’, “healthy, fair, and mutually beneficial relationship”.68 The 
relationship is solidified by high level contacts by governments, business and 
social organisations. South Africa and Kenya relations could also benefit from 
high level official visits, especially by heads of states, involving the business 
community and as well as social organisations. 
Kenya is identified as the regional hub for trade and finance in East Africa but 
its development is affected by the reliance on primary goods whose price has 
remained low in global markets and corruption (Sebei, 2006). At this stage the 
country’ position as a regional economic hub is fragile following the December 
2007 contested election results. The post- election was a threat to Foreign 
Direct Investment but the political recovery was able to… 
                                               
66
 Interview with official. Polokwane. January 2008. 
67
 Business guide. Internet edition.  Africa Business Pages. Promoting your business in Africa. “Kenya 
in focus”  http://www.africa-business.com/kenyainfocus.html-  Accessed 16/ 01/2008. 
68
 Business guide. Internet edition.  Africa Business Pages. Promoting your business in Africa. “Kenya 
in focus”  http://www.africa-business.com/kenyainfocus.html- Aacessed 16/ 01/2008 
 69 
 
As mentioned before, political and economic relations between South Africa 
and Kenya have improved since 2002. In 2004, a science and technology 
agreement was signed between the two. The signing of the Joint Commission 
of Cooperation (JCC) could be viewed as an umbrella agreement, politically 
revealing that relations between South Africa and Kenya were improving.69 
The purpose of the Commission was to enhance cooperation in “agricultural, 
cultural, economic, educational, political, security, sports, science, technical 
and trade fields; and to coordinate initiatives in this regard as well as to 
facilitate; and to coordinate initiatives in this regard as well as to facilitate 
contacts between civil, parastatal and private sector structures of the 
parties”70 
The impression given by the business guide report was that relations on the 
economic front were not too pleasant. However; the trade imbalance by itself 
is not enough to suggest that South Africa and Kenya are rivalries, especially 
because the same challenge exists with all other African countries. The next 
sub- section reviews whether South Africa and Kenya are political or 
economic rivals, based on a few case studies. 
According to a media report, released in April 2000, Uganda and Kenya 
entered into a pact to boost regional trade but also to challenge South Africa’s 
presence into the region.71 South Africa being a bigger economic actor was 
feared to dominate the market and leave a thinner slice for regional actors 
themselves. 
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Some may argue that Kenya is able to pose as a ‘competitor’ for regional 
markets in the East African region, where it is an economic ‘powerhouse’. The 
Great Trek of South African companies north of the Limpopo has helped 
define the country’s agenda more clearly, with NEPAD used as a principle 
vehicle. According to a Kenyan journalist, when NEPAD was first launched, 
Kenya was slow to get involved because it was more focused on domestic 
affairs. According to these views the feeling was that the Kenyan leadership 
was not invited in the brainstorming of the concept and thus less interested in 
the NEPAD concept.72  
Case studies: 
The beer wars 
In October 1998, the entry of the South African Breweries (SAB) into the 
Kenya and the East African market ‘annoyed’ the Kenyan Breweries Limited 
(KBL). The unenthusiastic reception was fuelled by Pretoria’s protective high 
tariff wall against trading partners. The KBL wanted to bring in Tusker beer to 
South Africa but Tusker was refused entry into the South African market 
because its logo, (an elephant) infringed on the trade- mark rights of a local 
beer, the ‘Elephant’. Kenya warned that it would use the same strategy to 
push South African goods outside of its markets. In Kenya, the SAB and KBL 
accused each other of spoiling billboards in aggressive advertising 
campaigns.73 Local companies adopted cost cutting (including reducing staff) 
measures to ensure profits in a competitive environment where prices were 
dropping. The SAB had a larger market in Tanzania, relative to Kenya and 
Uganda because it managed to buy shares at the Tanzanian Breweries and 
enjoyed a market share of 80% in their joint venture. In 2000, the beer 
companies went as far as the courts. The East African Breweries Limited 
(EABL) and SAB battled over trademarks. SAB’s claim was that it had 
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trademark rights to use an elephant tusk since it was a registered logo South 
Africa though the rule prevented EABL from using it.74 
Njiraini explains that the penetration of South African Multinationals in Kenya 
was named by the media in the late 1990s; the BC and AC periods. The 
acronyms referred to the before and after Castle. Before then, few of South 
Africa’s companies in the Kenyan market, such as the Stanbic Bank (owned 
by the Standard Bank Group) were not considered a threat to domestic 
companies. South African multinational corporations were before then largely 
involved in Uganda and Tanzania.  When Castle entered the Kenyan market 
in 1998, it opened the door for other South African companies to do business 
in Kenya.  
The wars described above led Castle to withdraw from the market with an 
agreement that EABL buys all its operations.75  Some recall that the EABL’s 
Tusker failed to penetrate the South African market because of propaganda 
that it was made of urine, alienating the beverage from potential consumers. 
When Castle came to Kenya, it was also met with animosity. According to a 
Kenyan journalist, Castle did not move out because of consumers, but its war 
with EABL.  Infact some noted that consumers enjoyed lowered beer prices 
which were part of the competition. When they came in they even hired senior 
staff from EABL, the two battled each other to sponsor, and competed 
viciously. The disadvantage for Castle was that a new brand generally takes 
time before it’s established and that EABL had diversified products, spending 
lots of money on advertising. It is said that the competition had intensified so 
much that it had taken a patriotic side with EABL making the connection 
between beer drinking beer and national pride.76 
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Other investments 
A lot of South African companies have actually gone under; the ones doing 
well are either mergers or acquisitions (using existing networks) which in 
themselves do not bring new innovation but stamps on existing business77 
A Marketing Consultant based in Kenya, commented that within four years, 
“South African companies infiltrated all spheres of life in Kenya, and this is 
causing worry among local companies” South African companies doing 
business in Kenya include: banking (Stanbic), food outlets such as Steers, the 
pay- television service provider (Multichoice), and cinema (Numetro). One 
may argue that the suggestion that South African companies infiltrated ‘all 
spheres’ of the Kenyan economy was an overstatement given that South 
African goods still had to compete with local products.  
 Telkom South Africa was reported to be strategising on how it could acquire 
shares in Telkom Kenya. Still in the telecommunications industry, Econet 
Wireless, a South African company was in 2006 battling with the Kenyan 
government over its plans to roll infrastructure for mobile service provision. 
The company’s award by the Communications Commission Kenya was later 
withdrawn when then Minister of Information, Raphael Tuju alleged that 
procedure was not followed in the issuing of the licence.78 The 1998 beer 
wars brought fourth allegations that South Africa was using unfair tariffs to 
avoid Kenyan goods from entering their markets. There were also allegations 
from the state-owned Horticultural Crops Development Authority that Kenyan 
farm produce was deliberately kept out of the South African market.79 
The EASSY network 
Another challenge which captured media attention was the Eastern Africa 
Submarine Cable system (EASSy) project. The EASSy network project which 
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managed to secure $70.7 million financing, is expected to deliver cheap 
connectivity by 2009.80 Although South Africa’s Director-General of 
Communications, Lyndall Shope-Mafole in 2006 said South Africa had no 
intension of dominating the Eastern and Southern African telecommunications 
project81, there were concerns that smaller companies in less developed 
countries with fewer telecom operators may be disadvantaged as markets are 
liberalised. The 9900km East Africa submarine (EASSy) project aims to link 
African coasts along Durban and Port Sudan. The project has a bandwidth 
established to challenge the monopoly by SAT-3(dominated by Telkom) 
undersea cable, although other telecommunications have acknowledged that 
open access does not necessarily imply “access to equal capacity and 
prices.” The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and some internet 
service providers and regulators hold that the bandwidth prices would open 
access for all operators.82 Kenya announced that it would launch a similar 
project, named the East African Marine, but also expressed readiness to 
cooperate for affordable network connections within EASSy.83 According to 
officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Kenya, though there were politics 
around the EASSY network cable, it does not affect foreign policy relations.84 
There are however South African companies that have consolidated 
themselves in Kenya. They include among others, Old Mutual, Marketing, 
Woolworths, Research and Advertising groups and DSTV. Some have argued 
that those who were not able to penetrate the Kenyan market had a low 
opinion of the market and made no effort to integrate Kenyan business 
people.85 Indeed an Analyst from Old Mutual- Kenya argues that Old Mutual 
actually got to Kenya during the apartheid period but the reception was not 
‘particularly good’ then. Over time it improved because it started incorporating 
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locals and the people realised that it will be useful for the community. He 
explained that business picked up in the 1990s when local Directors were 
brought on board. This ensures that the products are tailor made for locals 
and people can identify the company as their own. The life insurance was 
famous for its life policies and the target group was initially for the minority 
high class because of the kind of services and pricing but now they’ve moved 
to cater for the middle class. Old Mutual was able to gain the confidence of 
the local customer but was also able to flourish because of little domestic 
competition.86  A member of staff at Woolworths- Kenya added that beyond 
consultations with locals to fit their products with the local market, they offered 
clothing ranges that were not domestically catered for.87 
Although there were cases of tensions on the economic front, there were also 
success stories and it would be advisable for South African multinationals with 
an interest in Kenya to learn from both experiences. The beer wars and 
issues surrounding the EASSy cable network above show that Kenya has not 
been an easy country for South Africans to work with. While it is true that 
these economic tensions have a bearing on the political environment, some 
(like Landsberg,) have argued that there should be a distinction between the 
South African businesses doing business in other African countries and South 
Africa’s foreign policy as carried out by the government. The case in South 
Sudan is one in which relations between governments as opposed to the 
business sector will be reviewed. 
South Africa- Kenya and the South Sudan peace process 
“We could not pride ourselves, as a country, on having peace while our next 
door neighbours were languishing in bloodshed. It is thus a matter of great 
pride for me, for Sudan and for Africa in general, that it took an African to do 
what foreigners could not, and thereby reiterate the fact that solutions to 
Africa’s problems will come from Africans themselves, from the rich recesses 
of the continent and not from outside of its borders”- forword by Daniel  
Toroitich arap Moi, former President of Kenya (Waihenya, 2006: vi). 
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The acclaimed role was the successful mediation process facilitated by 
Kenya’s special envoy to Sudan, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. The sentiments 
expressed by former President Daniel arap Moi, are also reflected in Thabo 
Mbeki’s vision for the African renaissance which was discussed in Chapter 2. 
Indeed the vision that Kenya (specifically within the region) and South Africa 
had for the continent is similar with regards to promoting democratic peace 
through processes which are driven by Africans themselves. 
 
Both Kenya and South Africa have voluntarily agreed to be peer reviewed 
through the African Peer Review Mechanism. The two countries play 
important roles within their regions to advance the vision for democratic peace 
and development. Common to this vision and in line with the African 
Renaissance and its NEPAD action plan is the idea that military solutions 
cannot bring sustainable peace (Waihenya, 2006).  South Africa was active in 
the NEPAD process which is an important way of showing that African leaders 
are serious about good governance.88 It is in this context that we can 
understand South Africa’s desire to be part of multilateral efforts to promote 
peace, stability and democratic governance in the continent. 
Sudan is the largest African nation which neighbours Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Dunn and Shaw (2001) have described Africa as a 
continent with fluid boundaries where conflicts in one nation often affect 
neighbours whose populations share some form of kinship or religious 
affiliation with each other. 
The conflict in Sudan that has been ongoing since independence has forced 
many outside of their homes.89 Sudan is a nation that has been at war with 
itself over various complex and interconnected issues such as national unity 
and the desire for autonomy/ right to self determination by the South, power 
and wealth sharing, the fight for a multi- ethnic, multi- racial, multi- religion 
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Sudan, democracy and respect for the values of all of Sudan’s people. 
Kenya’s involvement in helping the Sudanese find peace is also because it 
has itself been affected by the spilling of the displaced into its northern 
borders (Waihenya, 2006). 
Kenya as a forefront member of IGAD has been promoting talks between the 
warring factions in Sudan as far back as 1989. The process has indeed been 
a long one, bringing together members of IGAD in the interest of peace. 
Earlier initiatives included the Addis Ababa, August 1989; Nairobi December 
1989; Abuja May/July1992; Abuja April May 1993; Nairobi, May 1993; and 
Frankfurt, January 1992. At the signing of the 1994 Declaration of Principles 
(DOP), the SPLM/A insisted on a “zero interim” period favouring the splitting 
of North and the South Sudan instead of national unity, while the government 
refused to sign until 1997 at a summit in Nairobi. The DOP later served as a 
guide to future negotiations between the warring factions. Provisions of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 include; the 
Machakos Protocol (20th July 2002: Kenya), Power Sharing (26th May 2004: 
Naivasha, Kenya), Wealth Sharing (7 January 2004: Kenya), The 
Resolution Of The Abyei Conflict (26th May 2004: Naivasha), Resolution 
Of The Conflict In Southern Kordofan And Blue Nile States (26th May 
2004: Naivasha), and Security Arrangements (25th September 2003: 
Naivasha) (Waihenya, 2006). These provisions shall not be explained 
because what is important to this thesis is the way in which South Africa and 
Kenya related to each other in the bid to extend or encourage peace in 
Sudan. 
When General Sumbeiywo accepted the call to be Kenya’s envoy, it was a 
difficult time because IGAD member states were in conflict with each other ( 
Sudan had taken sides in the Ethiopia- Eritrea conflict, Uganda supported the 
SPLM/A which was fighting against the Sudanese government while Sudan 
supported the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda). Furthermore, IGAD was 
experiencing financial difficulties, with the international community having lost 
faith in it. The implication is that Kenya did not only provide the diplomacy that 
‘oiled’ the peace processes but as was evident in the venues of most talks, it 
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had to commit other resources at a time when only a few were interested 
(Waihenya, 2006). 
Having demonstrated IGAD’s and indeed Kenya’s active role in the South 
Sudan peace process, Waihenya (2006) interestingly mentions the ‘sudden’ 
interest of other members at a critical stage of the talks just before the signing 
if the CPA. Waihenya explains that as weariness set in at the Machakos talks 
(June 2002), only Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea were left in the 
negotiations. There were also those who gave practical and necessary 
support, such as former US President Jimmy Carter, Nicholas Haysom 
(Lawyer from the South African Constitutional Court) and Julian Hottinger 
(from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs). 
The Machakos Protocol (July 2002) was a major breakthrough and after its 
signing, Waihenya exclaimed that “All of a sudden, many more people wanted 
to come aboard. In the scramble for the cake of success, everyone wanted to 
be left holding at least a crumb. Letters began flying to the IGAD Secretariat 
and to the Government of Sudan” (Waihenya, 2006:92). 
Kenya regards the East African region as its territory and guards it with 
resolve. Such was the case during the processes that led to the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the 
Republic of Sudan (GOSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ 
Army (SPLM/A). Waihenya (2006) explains that among the newly interested 
parties were Egypt, Northern political parties (including the National 
Democratic Alliance), Sudanese Women’s Association in Nairobi and the 
Sudan National Labour Party.  France apparently sent an envoy with $100, 
000 to the Secretariat in order to secure a seat. South Africa, as the Chair of 
the African Union also wanted to be in and so were the Arab League and the 
UN.  Waihenya then says that Sumbeiywo was careful not to allow the peace 
process to be ‘hi-jacked’ by people who had “all along stayed on the fence” (p. 
92) and were now only coming in because there was now a beacon of hope. 
Only the AU and the UN were invited as observers. Kenya guarded the South 
Sudan peace process jealously, with the intent of saving the process from 
collapsing with too many hands meddling. Beyond these reasons given by 
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Waihenya, there could also have been a desire for Kenya to be recognised as 
the champion of the peace process. A desire which might have been deferred 
if other actors who claim to have mediation skills were allowed to take part 
and thus overshadow Kenya’s and indeed IGAD’s hard work through the 
years. 
 
It is easy to understand why the South Africans agreed. First the meeting was 
held in a multilateral setting, where they could get the support of other AU 
Members. When Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma visited Nairobi on November 
2006, she was briefed on IGAD, also because of South Africa’s role in the 
United Nations Security Council. South Africa has reiterated that it supports 
Kenya and IGAD and would not interfere unless asked by a recognised 
multilateral body such as the AU. According to South African officials, there 
was  no division of labour; South Africa was willing to support any initiatives 
through the multilateral engagement. Issues of resource capacities and belief 
that Kenya was rightly positioned for instance kept South Africa away from the 
Horn, unless it was there as part of a multilateral delegation/ mission. 
Although South Africa supported IGAD, it did not interfere unless was asked 
to do so. 90 
 
In July 2002, there was a meeting in Nakuru to mediate between the parties, 
attended by observers. The Government of Sudan refused to sign the 
document prepared by Sumbeiywo. There was an AU meeting at the same 
time in Maputo and it was at that meeting that the Sudanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in his presentation to the Council of Ministers praised IGAD’s 
process but asked that South Africa takes over the negotiations, the South 
Africans agreed. Back in Nakuru the talks reached a stalemate (Waihenya, 
2006). 
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“Earlier, Sumbeiywo had heard that the Sudanese government, which by now 
had come to regard Kenya as too pushy on the question of peace, had 
approached South Africa with a proposal that they take over the negotiations, 
the South Africans agreed” (Waihenya, 2006: 115). 
Waihenya argues that from the Kenyan point of view, the reason why Sudan 
asked South Africa to mediate was merely to delay the peace process. This 
message was communicated to South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Hon. Dr Nkosazana Zuma) by her Kenyan counterpart (Hon. Kalonzo 
Musyoka). South Africa then agreed to drop their ‘acceptance’. Waihenya 
commented that if South Africa took over the talks; previous gains would have 
had to be reversed and a fresh- start (which might undermine the IGAD peace 
process) would have had to begin. He adds that given that South Africa was 
suggested by the government of Sudan, there was no guarantee that the 
SPLM/A would have accepted their proposal.  At the Maputo Ministerial 
meeting, it was agreed that IGAD would continue with negotiations and South 
Africa help in the implementation of the process, particularly in reconstruction. 
On December 31st 2004, President Al Bashir was to witness the signing of the 
peace agreement, Thabo Mbeki was also present as a witness. The CPA was 
finalised and signed on January 2005. Some expected that South Africa 
would have been more prominent in South Sudan but IGAD was still active 
even after the signing of the CPA and this showed that South Africa had not 
entrenched itself while Kenya is still duly recognised.91 
 
On her official visit to Kenya in November 2006, Minister Dlamini Zuma was 
briefed on developments in the Somalia, the Great Lakes Conference, 
Northern Uganda and relations between South Africa and Kenya. Regarding 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Sudan, they noted that more still 
needs to be done for its enforcement.  Dlamini Zuma said that South Africa 
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has so far helped in identifying areas of slow progress and is communicating 
with both the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A on a regular basis.92 
Given the information presented above, the next chapter shall examine 
whether South Africa’s foreign policy towards Kenya can be said to be 
informed primarily by realist, liberal or Marxist ideology.  These theoretical 
conceptualisations are useful in our understanding of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. It shall be concluded that neither of these theories are adequate in 
themselves and that a more accurate view of South Africa’s foreign policy will 
take into account the different conceptualisations. This is because foreign 
relations are themselves complex and are often affected by other factors such 
as class interests or the leadership personalities and thus simplifying them 
into a single theory or school of thought may be inaccurate. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy towards Kenya: realist, liberal or marxist? 
As noted earlier, South Africa’s reintegration into the world community in 1994 
came with a moral stature inherited from its transition to democracy from a 
system of white minority rule. Van der Ross (2004) pointed out that South 
Africa found itself in a continent which is still rife with conflict and poverty. 
South Africa hoped to bring a reconciliatory spirit derived from its relatively 
peaceful democratic transition.  The African Renaissance is an important 
factor in understanding South Africa’s Africa foreign policy.  
 
Kenya is an important country in the continent because of its economic and 
relatively stable political position (until December 2007) in the East African 
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region. The country’s position as a regional economic hub and mediator is 
fragile since the violence erupted at the contestation of the December 2007 
election results. It is important for Kenya to resolve its problems because 
neighbouring countries will also be economically affected since Kenya is a 
regional economic hub.   
 
Nye (2003) argued that soft power is the only ability to achieve your goals by 
persuading others to also accept them. South Africa through the African 
Renaissance and the multilateral approach exercises soft power when it 
engages with other African partners. One can argue that South Africa’s 
persuasiveness is, however, not very effective, considering the lukewarm 
attitude that its business sector and sometimes political figures have received 
from Kenya. This is in view of claims that Kenya observes how South Africa 
has behaved elsewhere in the continent.  
 
Those who argue that South Africa is acting as a sub-imperial state in the 
continent and using its moral standing as an instrument to achieve its goals 
view South African companies’ eagerness to enter into other parts of the 
continent as merely motivated by economic interests. In this view the reason 
why peace is so important to South Africa is to prepare the ground for its 
investors and big businesses whose interest is to squander resources. 
According to this argument South Africa (and Kenya’s) active roles in 
mediation is motivated by the realist desire to secure market access for the 
business class. There have been accusations that South Africans only want to 
promote peace so as to better reap economic benefits. Two years after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in South Sudan, both South 
African (PetroSA, SABMiller) and Kenyan (East African Portland Cement 
Company, Sameer Africa and Kenya Commercial Bank) companies have 
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moved into South Sudan to reap economic rewards.93  It should be noted, 
however, that in an increasingly globalising world, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with encouraging the business sector to expand their activities outside 
of their borders. One would concur with Kabemba that it is the responsibility of 
every government to create an atmosphere for its corporate sector to invest in 
other countries (Kabemba, 2007). South Africa has on its part called upon its 
business sector to respect business ethics in their engagement with other 
African countries.94 According to an official, perceptions of South Africa as a 
hegemon are mere ‘irritations’. It is hoped that the recently signed 
Memorandum of Understanding between South Africa and Kenya will allow for 
bilateral trade agreements. Whatever agreements that South Africa and 
Kenya might sign in the future will have to be tied to SACU and EAC since 
both countries are important players in their respective regions.95 
 
Advocates of Marxist arguments (like Harvey, 2004) believe that market 
liberalism will not deliver ‘people- focused’ growth for Africa but will increase 
the gap between the ‘haves and the have nots’. Indeed, some trade 
researchers have noted that South African companies actually have anti- 
competitive practices such as buying- off smaller companies to get big market 
shares.96 Some have argued that South African investments in Kenya (as in 
most parts of the continent) are not ‘green ventures’ but mergers, acquisitions 
and joint ventures. Acquisitions are met with resistance in Kenya, mergers 
and alliances probably work better because the benefits are supposedly 
shared. 97 
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In Kenya, South African multinationals face tough competition for markets.  It 
is ironical that it was the Kenyan business community and not the consumers 
or the so-called ‘proletariat’ who showed most hostility towards South African 
companies. A researcher has noted that in Kenya the political class has 
interests in the economy so national interests are often brought in to protect 
individual interests. The researcher brought into memory the case when 
Uchumi was facing mismanagement problems and Shoprite was coming in as 
a competitor, when the Kenyan government moved in to bail Uchumi out.98 
 
Marxist explanations point to class struggles as the cause of conflict and the 
accumulation of wealth as the motive of foreign policies on behalf of the 
capitalist class. The situation between South African multinationals and the 
Kenyan business community shows contrary to Marxist thinking that conflict 
can actually erupt from the same class when they are in pursuit of the same 
goal (markets and consequently profits). 
 
Although South Africa has a more developed infrastructure, technological 
‘know-how’, and finances than Kenya, it has not been able to penetrate the 
Kenyan market. This is given by the fact that Kenya’s own economic stance is 
relatively developed than those of its neighbours and it is able to present 
tough competition both within Kenya and in the East African region.  Some 
interviewees have pointed out that big South African multinationals like 
Shoprite failed to consolidate themselves in the Kenyan market because of 
the competition they received from local retailers such as Uchumi (although 
Uchumi was backed by the government). Some also noted that Kenya prefers 
to maintain domestic market share over goods they can also produce at good 
quality.99 Those who have been successful in Kenya e.g. Old Mutual and 
Woolworths have made an effort to integrate Kenyan business people and 
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have come in with goods and services which do not have strong domestic 
competition.100 
This thesis explained that although South Africa’s relations with Kenya were 
insecure in the early 1990s, there have been improvements. Trade imbalance 
and economic competition informs problem areas but careful policy 
considerations can help deal with this problem. Both South Africa and Kenya 
are significant in the integration of Regional Economic Communities and the 
aim to achieve a political union of Africa in the future. 101 In fact whatever 
economic agreements that South Africa and Kenya might have will have to 
reflect on regional arrangements. Allegations of unfair trade practices need to 
be investigated and a way forward must be found by authorities from both 
countries. One may concur with Sebei (2006) that there is trade potential in 
products whose main suppliers or buyers are not African such as bovine skin. 
He noted for instance that South Africa imports most of its bovine from 
Australia (74%) while Kenya exports mainly to Hong Kong (71%). 
 
South Africa was glad to participate on a multilateral level in South Sudan 
when it was invited as an AU observer. One can argue that by refusing to 
interfere as a unilateral actor when given the opportunity to do so by the 
Sudanese government, South Africa reaffirmed its commitment to 
multilateralism in Africa. In fact South Africa and Kenya can share mediation 
and negotiation experiences in order to help troubled countries find solutions 
to their problems. In the East African region, Kenya comes with a wealth of 
experience as well as the ‘soul of the region’ but also needs other actors who 
are willing to assist in a multilateral environment. Given the current instability 
in Kenya (which was active in peace initiatives in the region through IGAD), 
one would submit that there is a need to focus on interested multilateral actors 
as partners in promoting peace initiatives in East Africa and elsewhere in the 
continent for that matter.  The issue of norms and values which are promoted 
by both South Africa (Solomon, 1997) and Kenya (through IGAD in east Africa 
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and the Horn) shows that foreign policy is not primarily driven by ‘real politik’ 
self interests. 
 
If the South Africa- Kenya foreign policy relations are to improve, then the 
heads of states need to show some seriousness. Official state visits by heads 
of states make a big difference especially in speeding up the consolidation 
and concretisation of MOUs. There also need to be more cultural exchanges 
to include not just the political and economic classes but also civic 
organisations. 
 
Both South Africa and Kenya can learn from each other. According to an 
official at the South African High Commission in Nairobi, South Africa can 
learn from Kenya since they have been engaged in the region for a longer 
time. The official said South Africa is also willing to learn from Kenya on the 
science and technology around herbal medicines which may be useful in the 
fight against AIDS.102 Indeed the Kenyan government has taken decisive 
steps to address the pandemic and South Africa which is often criticised for its 
AIDS policies can learn a great deal from Kenya. 
 
There is room for more collaboration in agriculture and exchange of research, 
as confirmed by the Limpopo Department of Agriculture. 103 The two countries 
can identify other areas of collaboration and joint research so as to enhance 
mutual economic benefits. A possible area of future collaboration is in 
infrastructure development.104 South African engineers can be brought in to 
help improve Kenya’s road infrastructure but this has to be well managed. 
This would work not only as transfer of skills and improve Kenya’s transport 
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system but also prepare the way for South African construction industries to 
invest in East Africa’s most developed economy.  
 
South Africa and Kenya do not have different ideals, they both want to 
promote business activities in the East African region and have been at the 
forefront of mediation efforts. It would be too simplistic to claim that they are 
political and economic rivals since South Africa is a much bigger economy, 
politically Kenya has a stronger hold in the region and also issues perceived 
dominance come into play. South Africa has to be careful how it projects itself 
not just in Kenya but also elsewhere in the continent. The fact that Kenya 
authorities do not ‘trust’ South African mediators is disappointing especially if 
relations are to be improved.  
 
Each traditional theory captures an aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy 
towards Kenya. The traditional theories however fail to account for historical 
background, personalities, the lack of trust, and the political will or lack thereof 
to concretise MOUs. Traditional international relations theories by themselves 
cannot explain the force of perception which affects the way South Africa’s 
political and economic classes are received in Kenya. One can thus conclude 
that South Africa’s foreign policy towards Kenya and indeed the rest of Africa 
is rather a combination of Realist, Liberal, Marxist and even other 
considerations which do not necessarily fit into the traditional schools of 
thought. 
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